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ABSTRACT 
 
  
 
The thesis focuses on the Five Star Movement, a political movement in Italy based on an Internet 
blog, which was founded by the Italian comedian Beppe Grillo and which in just four years from 
its birth received the greatest number of votes in that country’s 2014 European election. The 
thesis focuses on the rise of 5SM, which was established in a critical political and economic 
context that provided a fertile environment for its founder’s anti-establishment platform and 
rhetoric. The structure, ideology and actions of the 5SM movement are examined as are the 
political and economic contexts in which it arose and now operates.   
 
The 5SM is analyzed as a product of an Italian political culture where populist leaders have 
dominated the political scene for many years. The thesis asks whether this movement can be 
defined as populist, using as a framework for analysis the work of Mény and Surel “Democracies 
and the Populist Challenge” (2002), by comparing the 5SM to other European anti-establishment 
political parties and movements. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Focus of Thesis (The 5SM) 
 
The recent impressive surge of the Five Star Movement (5SM) is currently at the center of 
scholarly debate in Italy and in Europe.  The 5SM is the only protest movement in western 
democracies that, only four years from its birth, has managed to receive 25.5% of votes in the 
2013 Italian national election, the largest percentage of votes received by a single party or 
movement that contested that election. This fact is even more astonishing given that the 5SM 
lacks physical headquarters, officials, and employees, and that it is a movement based on an 
internet blog managed by a private company specializing in online marketing and 
communication. 
 The major themes in the platform of the 5SM are protecting the environment, fighting 
against corruption and demanding more participatory democratic institutions.  The 5SM’s leader, 
a famous Italian comedian known as Beppe Grillo, has criticized Italy’s party system and that 
country’s backward capitalistic economy for many years before entering politics. Grillo decided 
to remain outside Parliament and has asserted that he is simply the spokesman for the movement 
because the 5SM was deliberately structured to have no leader. Nevertheless, in practice his style 
of leadership is rather authoritarian in that he has tolerated neither the emergence of other 
prominent figures within the movement nor having open discussions on many crucial topics. 
 The 5SM considers itself part of a global process because it believes that the web’s 
technological capacity will facilitate the replacement of representative democracies with direct 
democracies. Therefore, its goal of eradicating corruption in the Italian political system is 
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coupled with the messianic promise of a political regime that will be governed directly by 
citizens. This so-called webtopia is reinforced by the 5SM’s communication strategy of relying 
on the Internet and apparently neglecting traditional media such as television and newspapers. 
Because Grillo’s ideas and platform are difficult to classify in traditional scientific categories, 
some scholars (Bartlett, Birdwell & Littler, 2011; Madhi, 2013) have coined the phrase “digital 
populism” to define this new political message and rhetoric and the media used to spread it.  
 The 5SM is still a somewhat ill-defined political organization with conflicting internal 
tendencies. This is evident in the following principles and practices:  it talks about progressive 
themes, yet does so in a way that also attracts people with right-wing orientation; it advocates 
participatory democracy yet is based upon absolute leadership; it emphasizes the importance of 
fighting corruption but does not firmly condemn tax evasion. Consequently, even if there is 
general agreement on labelling the 5SM a populist movement, it is unclear whether this is right 
wing, left wing, environmental or neo-libertarian populism. 
 
 
1.2Value of Thesis 
 
Since its great success in the 2013 national elections, many scholars and commentators have 
analyzed the 5SM and its main characteristics. Some elements drew much attention because of 
their uniqueness in the European political scene: the history of Beppe Grillo as anti-system 
comedian coming from public television, its synergic union with the web specialist Casaleggio; 
the communication strategy of the 5SM, which combines grassroots classical mobilization with 
web-based activism; the astonishing growth the 5SM experienced when its anti-establishment 
rhetoric started attracting voters from all political inclinations; the organizational difficulties the 
5SM had to face after his success, especially in dealing with internal dissent; the peculiar nature 
of its "web-topia", a project that aims to change representative democracy with a system of 
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digital direct democracy and, finally,  the rather authoritarian nature of Grillo's leadership inside 
the movement. 
From the point of view of the political classification, almost all the scholars are cautious, 
recognizing the populist nature of Grillo's message, but still waiting for the institutionalization 
and normalization of the movement, that still appears liquid and containing diverse ideological  
positions (Corbetta & Vignati, 2014; Diamanti, 2014; Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2013). Biorcio 
(2014) compares the 5SM with the German Green Party at the beginning of its political history 
and other scholars compare it with the neopopulist right-wing parties (Corbetta & Gualmini, 
2013), but always highlighting the significant differences that still divide Grillo’s movement 
from these parties. 
Santoro (2012) highlighted that Grillo's rhetoric and anti-politics attitudes come from a 
right-wing political culture that has been widespread in Italy by commercial television. Others 
intellectuals (Wu Ming, 2013; Scalfari, 2007) point out that his attacks against the political 
opponents and his tactical positioning neither on the right nor on the left on many political issues 
are themes that are typical of new right-wing parties, especially at the beginning of their political 
trajectory.  
Some commentators, instead, see the 5SM as a progressive movement that expresses the 
voice of social groups that have been hit the hardest from the economic crisis (Spinelli, 2013; 
Travaglio, 2013) and that do not feel represented by traditional parties these experts support the 
idea that the 5SM's threat can be a positive stimulus for a reform of Italian political system. 
The present thesis takes into considerations all the characteristics the 5SM as a political 
phenomenon, puts together. The main attitude is not to deny that Grillo’s movement is something 
new both in the Italian and in the European political scene, but to understand in what sense it is 
innovative and what its innovations imply. This thesis is also an attempts at interpreting the 
5SM’s characteristics in light of the Italian political culture and at analyzing whether and to what 
extent its anti-system message is extremist and authoritarian.     
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1.3 Research Objectives and Research Questions of Thesis 
 
The two central objectives of this thesis are to explain the rise of the 5SM movement, and to 
explain the challenges in classifying the 5SM movement both as a party and a movement. 
 Defining the 5SM’s message and political strategies according to existing conceptual 
frameworks of parties and movements in the political science literature is the central objective of 
this thesis. My exploration will tentatively characterize the 5SM’s populism by comparing it with 
different families of movements and parties, in both the Italian and the international arenas.  
The sub-question the analysis generates deal with: whether the 5SM is a movement or a party; 
whether it can be considered populist; whether its populism is conservative or progressive, 
whether it has elements that can be called extremist or even totalitarian, and what sense it can be 
considered “an evolution” of the recent Italian populist parties. 
 
1.4 Organization of Thesis 
 
The remainder of this thesis consists of five chapters.  Chapter 2 provides an explanation of the 
emergence and success of the 5SM within the Italian political system. In providing that 
explanation this chapter focused on the economic and political factors that facilitated the 
unexpected emergence of this movement. Although the principal is on the economic and political 
crises in Italy, some attention is also devoted to the economic and political crises in the rest of 
Europe. 
 
Chapter 3 describes the main characteristics of the 5SM as a political entity. The analysis 
focuses on the structure, the internal governance, the political strategies, the composition of its 
constituency, and its ideology. Special attention is devoted to the important role the Internet 
plays in every facet of the 5SM as a political entity. Chapter 4 explains whether the 5SM is 
popular movement or a party, and what kind of populism is embodied or evident in its 
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ideological orientation and political behavior. It also explains whether that orientation and 
behavior reflect continuity with Berlusconi era of ‘cultural regression’, and whether the 5SM 
ideology and position on policy issues reflects democratic moderate and centrist attitudes or 
authoritarian or totalitarian and extremist radical attitudes.  
Chapter 5 compares the 5SM to other populist movements and parties in Italy, a few 
selected European countries, and two international movements. In Italy the focus is on recent 
populist parties like The Northern League, Forza Italia and the Italy of Values. In the selected 
European countries the focus is on the groups of neopopulist parties of the new-left, the new 
radical left (exemplified by SIRIZA in Greece) and the Pirate parties in Sweden and Germany. 
The comparison with international social movements focuses on Occupy Wall Street and the 
Indignados. The focus of the comparison between the 5SM and all those movements is on the 
structure, leadership, ideology and policy positions. 
Chapter 6, the concluding chapter, summarizes and analyzes the findings related to each 
of the major objectives, and discusses the need for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE GENESIS AND SUCCESS OF THE 5SM 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an explanation of the emergence and success of the 5SM. In providing that 
explanation this chapter focuses on the economic and political factors that facilitated the 
unexpected emergence of this movement. Although the principal focus is on the economic and 
political crises in Italy, some attention is also devoted to the economic and political crises in the 
rest of Europe. 
The chapter consists of two major sections devoted in turn to the following: the factors that led to 
the emergence of the 5SM, and the factors that contributed to the success of the 5SM. 
 
 
2.2 Factors Leading to Rise of 5SM 
     
2.2.1 The Political Factors that Led to Rise of  5SM 
As noted in the first chapter of this thesis the 5SM movement is a political movement started by 
a charismatic comedian who specialized in political satire. It is fair to say that without Giuseppe 
“Beppe” Grillo, the 5SM would not exist. Grillo was born in Genova in 1948. His father was a 
small entrepreneur and his mother was a pianist. After he left University he started to work as a 
stand-up comedian in local clubs and theaters. At the end of the seventies, he began to work for 
Italian public television. His caustic satire, mainly concentrated on politicians, caused his 
expulsion from public television in 1986. After that controversy, he continued to appear on TV 
programs intermittently, until 1993, when “he left definitively” (Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2013, p. 
3).  
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This contentious relationship with public television enhanced his image as an “anti-
system warrior”. In the following years Grillo performed his shows in public squares and 
theaters, and his critique of the economic and political systems sharpened. His main themes were 
the dominance of financial capitalism that controls politicians at every level, as well as the need 
for an environmental revolution. During this period Grillo addressed the public about issues that 
he would later support in his political campaigns, such as opposition to the privatization of the 
water supply and the lack of objective and independent information in Italy. In particular, the 
theme of information freedom became very important for progressive public opinion because 
Silvio Berlusconi, when he was prime minster, had almost total control of both private and 
public television.  International commentators and sources such as Reporters Without Borders 
denounced and stigmatized this deficit of pluralism in the media system (Reporters Without 
Borders, 2003).  
A matter that led to a huge growth of credibility for Grillo as something more than a 
simple comedian was his well-timed warning of Parmalat’s financial collapse of 2003 (Grillo, 
2004). Parmalat, at the time a big multinational Italian dairy and food corporation, went bankrupt 
with a huge uncovered debt (Chalkidou, 2012), and many Italian investors lost their investment 
in the company. This financial disaster brought to light the lack of transparency within the  
system: no public authorities,  politicians and none of the main newspapers and television chains 
shed light on the  situation before it was too late. Grillo had the indisputable merit of raising the 
issues many months in advance, and this earned him the plaudit of many Italian and foreigner 
observers as well as a huge rise in popularity. 
Grillo’s main polemical target until 2007 was, undoubtedly, Silvio Berlusconi. He never 
overtly supported the opposition political parties, but nevertheless he criticized them much less 
than Berlusconi and his allies.  In 2006 Grillo expressed his preference for Romano Prodi, the 
leader of the center-left coalition, over the center-right leader in the coming national elections. 
His endorsement, of course, was not enthusiastic, declaring that Prodi was “just the slightly less 
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bad alternative” (Scanzi, 2012, p. 5), but he demonstrated that he still accepted the rules of 
democracy and the necessity of making the most rational possible choice.  
  
2.2.2 Grillo’s Encounter with Casaleggio 
In 2004 Grillo, after one of his shows, met Gianroberto Casaleggio, an expert on web 
communication, who talked about the Internet in an enthusiastic and utopian way. In Grillo’s 
words: “It was quite clear, he was a madman; mad with a new madness in which everything goes 
better thanks to the web” (Hooper, 2013, ch. 3). Casaleggio convinced Grillo to start a blog on 
which he could share his ideas with his followers and receive feedback from them. So in 2005 
the blog beppegrillo.it was established and, from the first moment, it was hugely successful. The 
blog contained articles, news, comments and videos about Grillo’s various performances. The 
blog also promoted political campaigns that the comedian waged in public squares or theaters, 
the most famous among them being the fight against Italian participation in the Iraqi war and the 
initiative “Clean Parliament” that aimed to expel from the Parliament all the MPs convicted of 
criminal offences.  
 In July 2005 Grillo announced the creation of the ‘Meetup’ project. The project 
envisioned the use of the online platform ‘Meetup’ comparable to the one that had been used by 
the American Democratic politician Howard Dean in the 2004 presidential primary elections. 
The anti-corruption and environmentalist agenda that Grillo was then putting forward could, in 
this way, take root and be supported by local groups and associations that were already active at 
the grassroots level.  The goal was connecting these local groups and individuals, allowing more 
structured support for the comedian’s ideas throughout the country. 
The establishment of these groups was very successful and they sprang up all over Italy. 
After a number of years there were more than one hundred ‘Meetup’ groups in Italy and at the 
beginning of 2014 there were more than one thousand (Gruppi Meetup Beppe Grillo, 2014). As 
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explained by Biorcio “the ‘Meetup ‘platforms allow the followers of the blog to organize 
themselves as local activists in constant reciprocal connection and to maintain, at the same time, 
a strong relationship to the blog’s management at a national level” (Biorcio, 2013, ch. 2). 
Grillo received several acknowledgments from foreigner observers: In 2005 Time 
magazine listed him among the “European heroes of the year in the media world”. In 2008, The 
Guardian included Grillo's blog among the world's most influential, and in 2009 Forbes listed 
him among the ten web celebrities of the year. 
 Casaleggio was born in Milan in 1954. He grew up in a middle class family and began his 
career in the eighties as a software designer at the famous Italian electronic company, Olivetti. 
Over the years, he held positions as CEO, chairman and managing director in such high tech 
companies as Logica Plc, Finsiel and Telecom Italia (Tanda, 2013). In particular, he was CEO of 
Webegg SpA, a group specializing in web and network strategies. He was removed from this 
office by the shareholders in 2003, after some disappointing financial results. In 2004 he founded 
his own web counselling company, Casaleggio Associati Srl. 
Casaleggio’s communication company is the editor of Grillo’s blog and of some books 
written by the comedian. In 2009 he founded the 5SM together with Grillo and he is considered 
both the spin-doctor and the strategist of the movement.  Many critics talk about him as “the 
guru”, stigmatizing his visionary ideas and his eccentric appearance.  
Casaleggio believes that the Internet can revolutionize the existing democratic structures: 
“The current political and social organizations will be deconstructed, some will disappear. 
Representative democracy, by delegation, will lose meaning. It is a revolution that is cultural 
even more than technological; this often is not properly understood or is trivialized.” ("La 
democrazia va rifondata", 2013) This democratic revolution will be consequence of a world 
transformed by the power of global connection, where communication is horizontal and 
immediate. This vision is at the basis of the political mission of the 5SM. It inspires in   his 
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supporters the conviction of being an instrument that will accomplish a political revolution that 
follows from the technological progress of human society.  
 
2.2.3 Grillo’s Critique of Established Parties  
After Romano Prodi was installed as Prime Minster in 2006, Grillo arranged to speak with him 
to demand action on his favorite issues. The meeting was video-recorded and posted on Grillo’s 
blog. Prodi listened to Grillo’s torrential speech and to his unattainable proposal with an attitude 
that was ironic, but not hostile. The new center-left government had a very narrow majority in 
the Senate, so it was impossible for him to implement some reasonable proposals (like an anti-
trust law to forbid the dominant position of Berlusconi in the media sector) advocated by Grillo’s 
blog, let alone the most radical ones. 
As a result, the comedian began to criticize center-left policies with the same anger and 
sarcasm with which he criticized Berlusconi. The idea that Grillo started spreading was that the 
center-left was not substantially different from Berlusconi’s center right and that Italian 
politicians of all colors constituted an out-and-out “caste” of the people’s exploiters.  That is why 
he called the big rally he organized in Bologna in September 2007, Vaffanculo-DAY, or V-DAY 
(“Fuck-off Day1”). That day Grillo collected 350,000 signature for a bill that would: (1) bar 
people found guilty of crimes from being elected to and maintaining the status of 
parliamentarian; (2) forbid parliamentarians to remain in office for more than two terms; and (3) 
introduce the discretion to choose the candidate and abolish the parties’ blocked lists in the 
                                                          
1
 “Vaffanculo Day” in Italian. The initial V, drawing from the movie V for Revenge (In Italian Vendetta) has 
become a part of the 5SM’s logo, indeed there it is written with the capital V, “MoVimento” (MoVement, in 
English). 
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electoral system. These proposals had a strong appeal to progressive and independent voters, 
because after years of Berlusconi's premiership, the parliament was teeming with members 
convicted or accused of serious crimes. 
Prodi’s center-left government fell at the beginning of 2008, so new national elections 
were to take place in the spring. Grillo this time did not express any preference, saying that the 
Democratic Party and Berlusconi’s party were just two facets of the same problem. The 
comedian declared that he would start to support lists in local elections, allowing the use of the 
logo “friends of Beppe Grillo” by all the groups that met the requirements of being without a 
criminal record and lack of party affiliation. As a result of his endorsement, these lists managed 
to elect some representatives to municipal councils. 
On April 25, 2008 Grillo organized another V-DAY in Turin, but this time he focused his 
anger on the “fascism of the Italian media” (V2daychannel, 2008). He accused the main 
newspapers and TV networks of not providing objective and neutral information. This was a 
major issue for many progressive people at the time, also because a big scandal regarding the 
management of state owned televisions during Berlusconi’s government (2001-2006) had just 
emerged. The situation that came to light through wiretaps of an inquiry initiated by the courts, 
was that of a secret agreement between managers of Berlusconi’s networks and managers of 
public television to broadcast and interpret the news in a manner that would not endanger the 
reputation of the center-right government
2
. (Mauro, 2007)   
  
 
                                                          
2
 The Italian newspaper La Repubblica reconstructed the relations between the management of the two media 
Corporations http://www.repubblica.it/2007/11/sezioni/cronaca/media-rai/struttura-delta/struttura-delta.html 
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2.2.4 Rejection of Grillo by the Partito Democratico (PD) 
During the summer of 2009, Beppe Grillo, to the surprise of many, presented his candidacy as 
secretary of the Partito Democratico (PD). The officers of the PD, though, did not allow him to 
become a member of the party because he had too harshly criticized it during the previous years. 
The secretary of PD, Piero Fassino, commented on the barring of the comedian from being 
accepted by the party with a sentence that will be remembered for a long time: “Let Grillo form 
his own party and let's see how many votes he gets.” (theGianlucaTV, 2013)  That is precisely 
what Grillo went on to do.   
 Grillo and Casaleggio founded the 5SM in October 2009, declaring that it was time for 
citizens to overthrow the corrupt regime of traditional parties. The "five stars" represent five key 
issues the movement aims to pursue: public water supply, sustainable development, widespread 
Internet connectivity, clean and accessible public transportation and environmental protection. 
The movement was based on citizens participating in Grillo’s blog and in ‘Meetup’ local groups, 
so no headquarters or intermediate offices were needed. 
 
2.3 The Electoral Success of 5SM 
 
Within one year of its founding the 5SM started experiencing electoral success that would 
continue in subsequent years through elections at various levels of the Italian political system. 
The foundations for the electoral success of the 5SM in national elections started being laid at the 
same time as the national governing institutions were perceived as becoming increasingly 
dysfunctional as a result of the increasingly chaotic and unpredictable behavior of its principal 
political agents. Of particular significance was the behavior of Prime Minister Berlusconi in the 
midst of one of the most significant economic and financial crises in recent history. 
  The situation became so problematical that by the end of 2011 Berlusconi was forced to 
resign after the country came close to financial default. This had been caused by the international 
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market’s lack of confidence in Italy’s economic and budgetary management. Mario Monti, an 
economist and notable academic, was nominated by the President of the Republic as Prime 
Minister. He undertook radical policies of deficit reduction to regain the market’s confidence. 
The market reacted in a positive way and the confidence in Italian bonds rose sharply. After a 
few months, however, as the financial situation improved, Berlusconi’s party, that sustained the 
government together with the PD, started to undermine the actions of the executive, so that 
further major reforms became impossible.  
 Monti was a big disappointment for the Italian people who needed a change after years of 
corruption and inefficiency. Although initially he was highly popular, as he was seen as an agent 
of modernization combatting a traditional opposition to progress, eventually after he was 
hobbled by the parties, people began to see him as a part of the problem because they did not 
support his austerity measure and started depicting him as another member of the caste of the 
political-financial elite that opposed people’s interests. The disappointment with Monti’s 
government spurred a general revulsion of politics that favored the growth of the 5SM.  
 
2.3.1 Success of 5SM in Local and Regional Elections 
The first significant electoral success for the 5SM amidst the political and economic crises of 
that era occurred in the 2010 regional elections in which it fielded candidates. The most notable 
success was in Emilia-Romagna, where it received 7.0% of the vote and two of its candidates 
were elected as regional councilors, and in Piedmont, where it received 4.1% of the vote two of 
its members were elected as councilors. 
The 5SM experienced more electoral success in the local elections of May 2011. The 
Movement ran in several municipalities, including 18 provincial capitals. Notable results were 
attained in the cities of the center-north, especially in Emilia-Romagna and in Piedmont. The 
most notable performance was in the historically left leaning city of Bologna, where the 5SM got 
very close to 10 percent of the vote.  
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The success of the 5SM in the 2011 local elections was repeated in the local elections of 
2012. In the 2012 local elections the 5SM gained many votes in several cities of the North, 
approaching 20% in some cases. In a small north-eastern town, the M5S elected its first mayor 
with more than 30% of the votes. In the run-offs the movement gained three more mayoralities. 
The most important victory was in the city of Parma, a city of 180,000 inhabitants famous in the 
world for the Parmigiano Reggiano cheese, its raw ham and the multinational corporation 
Parmalat. The previous center-right administration had brought the city to the brink of 
bankruptcy ("La Spip verso il fallimento. Comune sul precipizio", 2013), and many cases of 
corruption were prosecuted in the courts ("Tutto sullo scandalo corruzione", 2011).  
In the first round of the 2012 municipal election in early first week of May  the 5SM’s 
candidate, Federico Pizzarotti (a former project manager in a local bank without political 
experience), won about 19% of the vote, which allowed him to run in the second round against 
the candidate of the center-left who had a huge advantage of votes in the first round (he got 
39%). The run-off, held two weeks later , was a big surprise as Pizzarotti captured the center-
right votes and was elected with more than 60% of the total vote.  That particular election was 
symbolically very important because it showed that the 5SM could compete for power against 
the major parties. It demonstrated its capability to attract constituents that traditionally voted for 
centrist or right wing parties. The vote for the 5SM was no longer just a “protest vote” that 
reflected progressive people’s disappointment with the policies of center-left parties, but it came 
to be seen a vote that could lead to a reliable alternative to all traditional parties.  
The success in the municipal elections of the 2011 and 2012 revealed that the 5SM was 
on a strong and positive trajectory in continuing to gain electoral support at the local level. In 
2012 the 5SM also started to experience some electoral success in regional elections. The ability 
of Grillo to attract attention to the existence and platform of the 5SM was very important for that 
purpose. An example of this is that in the Sicilian regional elections of October 2012, Grillo 
launched his campaign with a three mile swim from the mainland to Sicily.  
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His promotional efforts held Giancarlo Cancelleri, 5SM’s candidate for the regional 
presidency, to come in third with 18.2% of the vote, and for the M5S placed first in Sicily’s 
election for the regional legislative assembly with 14.9%
3
. Although the candidate of the center-
left coalition became president of the regional assembly, 5SM’s unexpected result was a 
meaningful demonstration that the movement could attract many votes among the very 
traditionalist southern Italian voters.  
 
2.3.2 Success of the 5SM in the National Elections 
In February 2013, M5S participated in national elections. Grillo was not an electoral candidate, 
though his name was written on the ballot under the symbol of the movement. The candidates 
were chosen from among non-elected members of the local lists of the previous years, by way of 
an online referendum ("I numeri delle quirinarie", 2013) in which only a restricted number of 
people participated (about 28,000 supporters voted using the blog). In the 2013 national 
elections, the M5S attained an astonishing result:  25.55% of the vote (8,784,499 voters), the 
most voted party. It obtained many seats in both chambers but, since it was not in a coalition, it 
ended up third after the center left and the center right coalitions.  
 The polling experts suggest that in the last days before the elections some voters (four or 
five percent) shifted from the PD to the 5SM (Diamanti, Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2013) in a way 
that was unpredictable just 15 days before. This shift was probably due also to the huge rally 
Grillo organized on San Giovanni square in Rome (the square where left-wing party and unions 
historically rallied) to close his campaign, with the participation of about 80,000 people. (La 
Stampa, 2013). The 5SM elected 108 deputies (of 625) and 54 Senators (of 330). With these 
                                                          
3
 The Sicilian electoral system provides the direct election the president of the assembly, but, at the same time, gives 
citizens the possibility to elect representatives by way of a proportional system form different lists.  
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results, the Parliament was split into three parts, none of which had a majority of the seats 
required to form a government: the center left, the center right and the 5SM. 
 
 
2.4 Electoral Strategy Accounting for Electoral Success 
 
The electoral success of the 5SM at the national, regional and local levels, can be largely 
understood in terms of the ability of the leader to develop an electoral strategy based largely on 
framing key issues that resonated with a wide range of voters from across the entire political 
ideological spectrum.  
The 5SM’s voting constituency, like its core membership, is quite diversified and spans 
the full political spectrum from the left to the right. A substantial proportion of its constituency is 
from the left end of the spectrum. That support from voters on the left side of the spectrum has 
paid dividends in several places including Emilia Romagna, which traditionally has been a very 
progressive region and where the 5SM had its first major round of electoral successes. The votes 
from the left end of the spectrum came from left-leaning people disappointed with the left-wing 
parties’ policies and even misconduct, as well as from people who voted for minor 
environmentalist parties or who did not vote at all. The analysis of the 2010 local elections 
demonstrates this trend, and arguably the trend has continued in 2011, with the 5SM receiving a 
considerable percentage of votes in cities where the center-left parties were traditionally strong. 
In particular, the 5SM attracted voters from the “Italia dei Valori”, a party that was founded by a 
former magistrate, Antonio di Pietro, and that had often been part of the center-left coalition in 
the previous years. This party’s major issue was the fight against corruption and the rhetoric it 
employed to pursue that goal was explicitly populist (Tarchi, 2008).     
The analysis of the 2012 local elections revealed that the 5SM had also started to attract 
voters that came from the center-right coalition (Bordignon & Ceccarini 2013; Biorcio & Natale, 
2013; Corbetta & Gualmini, 2013). In particular, what is evident is a considerable shift of votes 
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from the Northern League, a party that fought for the autonomy and independence of northern 
Italy and that expressed both anti-establishment and anti-immigrant attitudes (Diamanti, 
Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2013). Thus, the 5SM was able to attain notable results also in the north 
east where the first 5SM mayor was elected ("Sarego primo sindaco movimento 5 stelle", 2012). 
Analyzing the increasing 5SM support in the polls, the percentage of citizens inclined to 
vote for the 5SM was conventionally about eight percent nationally, but after May 2012 – when 
the 5SM conquered Parma, the first city of considerable size - there has been a huge rise: after 
that month the percentage increased to about 20% and since then it has not fallen (Diamanti, 
Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2013). The 5SM’s potential constituency, in that period, was still mainly 
composed of former progressive voters (46%), but the part coming from center-right parties had 
remarkably increased (to reach almost 40% of the total) (Biorcio & Natale, 2013). 
How can this startling surge of the 5SM be explained? One element is the already 
discussed progressive loss of popularity of the Monti government. The other element is the 
several scandals involving the illegal or, at the very least, questionable use of the public funds 
allocated to the parties. All the parties were subjected to judicial inquiries, which had a huge 
public impact: during the worst recession since the thirties, while many citizens were desperately 
striving to make ends meet, the “caste” of politicians spent public money for their own advantage 
leading a luxurious lifestyle.  The Northern League and the Italia dei Valori were also involved 
in the scandals. This is important because it is very likely that the 5SM directly benefited from 
the decrease in popularity that afflicted these anti-system parties. 
The analysis of the 2013 vote (in which the 5SM had an impressive 25.5%) demonstrates 
that the movement has completed its transition and become “a catch-all party” (Diamanti, 
Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2013): attracting about a third of votes of the center-left and one third of 
the center-right. Also the social composition of the 5SM’s constituency reflects this tendency 
towards “normalization”, i.e., to reflect the composition of the voting public (Bordignon & 
Ceccarini 2014). At the beginning, Grillo’s voters were mainly young, male, Internet savvy with 
18 
 
a progressive outlook. Gradually, as the movement increased in popularity, the 5SM increased its 
support in every social category, with the significant exception of those over the age of 64. 
According to the “Lapolis” institute (Diamanti, Bordignon & Ceccarini  2013, chapter 5), in the 
2013 elections the 5SM was the party of choice among workers, (40.1%), entrepreneurs and 
small businessmen (40.2%), professionals (31.3%) and unemployed (42.7%): all categories that 
were hit hard by the economic crisis; it was relatively weak among housewives (20%) and 
retirees (11%). Overall, the 5SM’s constituency is younger than the national average and better 
educated (younger people usually are better educated than elderly people). 
As Biorcio and Natale (2013) show, the members and supporters of the 5SM constitute a 
rainbow coalition of voters who are more sensitive than other Italians to the need for a renewal 
of the political establishment, but in terms of other issues they tend to have the same priorities as 
voters of traditional parties. This is revealing about the nature of the movement, explaining how: 
“the world of movement is traversed by numerous subsets, which can be united by the bond 
represented by their spokesman, Grillo.” (Biorcio and Natale, 2013. Chapter 3)  Diamanti (2014) 
depicts this heterogeneous constituency through the metaphor of the bus: 
Like the driver of a bus, he has always planned new itineraries and different 
destinations, constantly picking up new and different passengers who, rather than 
remaining on foot, are prepared to follow the driver for part of the route, getting 
off at some stop short of the final destination, and with a very clear idea of the 
destinations they wish to avoid. (p.5)  
 
2.5 The Italian culture & media 
 
 To fully understand why a movement founded by a comedian, who uses vulgar and even violent 
tones was able to gain such popularity in Italy in so short time, it is necessary to  focus on the 
Italian political culture. Indeed, Italy has some anomalies that makes it unique among western 
liberal democracies. The first anomaly is the lack of pluralism in the Television system. The 
second, which is influenced by the media system, is the lack of a civic culture and care for 
common goods. 
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These two characteristics have interacted in the last thirty years, and this interaction generated a 
political culture that mixes a libertarian mindset with very backward, historically rooted 
attitudes. 
 
2.5.1. Media concentration and hegemony & political culture in Italy  
Italy until 1974 had a state public television (RAI) monopoly, financed by a compulsory license 
fee. At the beginning of the 1980s, Berlusconi’s private TV stations were given the privileged 
position of being the only RAI competitor, thanks to his linkages with important politicians. At 
present, even if other media groups are now active in the TV market, Berlusconi’s group 
continues to enjoy a dominant position as it controls many available frequencies. When he was 
prime minister, Berlusconi was even able to appoint the administrators of state television, his 
actual competitor. 
 This concentration of media power explains why he still has political approval in Italy, in 
spite of his misconduct, crimes and mismanagement of public finances that renders him 
detestable and ridiculous to the majority of Italians and even more to foreigner observers. Studies 
conducted during Berlusconi’s government clearly show, first, how important television was 
(and still is) compared to other media in providing political information to Italian citizens 
(Diamanti, 2007 ; Sartori, 1998) ; and, second, how the agenda setting of TV news broadcasts 
was manipulated in order to deemphasize scandals and the major failures of the Italian 
government.  
 As some authors have pointed out, commercial television supported a popular culture that 
was conducive to the spread of neoliberal ideas and values. The genre “infotainment”, in which 
unbiased fair and useful information is mostly absent, is the epitome of this new cultural trend. 
Panarari (2012) describes this “revolution” by resorting to Gramsci’s concept of hegemony: the 
cultural supremacy of the left over the masses – with its emphasis on public social programs and 
Keynesian economic thought– has been replaced by the individualistic sub-culture of private 
entertainment. 
 In Italy, this phenomenon was more evident than in other western countries. Indeed, there 
were no significant alternatives to that kind of commercial television. Therefore it had a strong 
effect on shaping the popular imagination. As Gandini (2012) shows in his movie, “Videocracy” 
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, this new pop (trash) culture mixed elements of libertarian individualism and elements of 
traditional culture like opposition to feminism and to women's emancipation.  
  The cult of personal success, of the self-made man, that Berlusconi embodies, was upheld 
without regard to the ethical issues of respect for rules and for other people. Taxes and social 
programs were discredited. They were depicted as damaging to the most productive people, as 
they took away from them resources that were wasted in a corrupt and inefficient way by the 
public sector. Another element was the barbaric exploitation of women's bodies in TV ads and 
broadcasts: the intensity of sexual objectification of women constitutes a unique case in western 
TV broadcast systems (Cosenza 2012). This male chauvinist vision has been accompanied by the 
upholding of local cultures and traditional family values, but in a way that fully assimilates the 
commercial models of mass consumption.   
  
2.5.2. Culture of “Familism” and “Clientism” 
To understand this unique combination of cultural factors, it is necessary to briefly describe the 
traditional south European elements of “familism” and “clientelism”, which are still present in 
present-day Italy. As Ginsborg (1995) shows, the traditional familial ties, mostly vertical, based 
on authority, have prevented the formation of a modern civil society, based predominantly on 
horizontal ties among individuals. The popular ethics of clientelism permeates public 
administration as well as citizens’ mindset, so that both find the ”arbitrary use of modern state 
resources for private gain” and the search of political approval through personal favors 
inevitable.  
 That kind of mentality extends the model of the family to the larger community, both in 
terms of values and in terms of personal relations. The disadvantaged position of women and 
their role in Italian society is a consequence of that attitude: it is part of a pre-modern legacy that 
is very difficult to get rid of.    
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2.6 Contextual Factors Accounting for Success of 5SM 
 
An understanding of the electoral success of the 5SM at the national, regional and local levels 
during this era requires attention to the national and continental political and economic contexts 
in which it occurred. These contexts, which were marked by historic crises are discussed, in turn, 
below.  
 
2.6.1 The Political Contextual Factors  
Anthony Painter (2013), in his recent essay on populism, describes the Italian political situation 
as one in which a democratic system faces great stress leading to a potential loss of political 
legitimacy. He likens Italy to Greece and explains that: “their democracies have shown to be 
incapable to respond to the complexities instigated by the Eurozone crisis.” (p.14). In another 
part of the essay, Painter talks about Italy as an almost unique case of a consolidated democracy 
that has not been able to get rid of populist threats: “the exceptions are perhaps Hungary under 
Fidesz and, arguably, Italy under Berlusconi where legal systems were brought under tighter 
control of the executive” (p. 21).  
 Italian democracy has been undermined during the last 15 years by the great 
concentration of power in the hands of Berlusconi. His privileged position in the media system 
allowed him to collect a huge fortune and at the same time, to have a strong impact on public 
opinion.  Furthermore, to explain the Italian political crisis that contributed to the emergence and 
the initial and continuing success of the 5SM, it is necessary to consider that Berlusconi’s era is 
not yet over.                                                                                                       
 In fact, despite his many political failures, despite his recent conviction for tax fraud and 
despite the countless scandals in which he was involved, Berlusconi still has his media empire 
and still can influence a considerable part of Italian public opinion. In November 2011 he had to 
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resign as Prime Minister because the yields of Italian bonds had skyrocketed, and the country 
was on the verge of bankruptcy.  
 To placate the markets the President of the Republic decided not to go to elections, and to 
nominate an economist with limited political experience – Mario Monti – as chief of the 
government. Berlusconi supported this executive for almost one year, but at the end of 2012 he 
decided it was time to go to the polls and thereby brought down Monti’s government.  
The 2013 elections did not give an absolute majority of the seats in both chambers to the 
Democratic Party, so it was forced, due to the refusal of the 5SM to join the PD, to compromise 
with Berlusconi to set up a government. At the end of 2013, Berlusconi decided that he wanted 
to stay in opposition, but this time a faction of his party abandoned him and allowed a majority 
with the Democratic Party and the centrists. Nevertheless, this new political formation did not 
break up with Berlusconi in a traumatic and definitive way, so that this coalition government will 
not probably be able to act against the interests of the Italian tycoon.        
  After years of economic disasters, pandemic corruption and low credibility in the 
International arena, almost two third of Italians strongly dislike Berlusconi. Nevertheless, many 
of these people blame the Democratic Party for not being able to get rid of him before, and some 
of them even think that the left parties were not willing to undermine him. The fact that the 
Democratic Party had been in coalition with Berlusconi to support Monti’s emergency 
government reinforced those popular suspicions.  
In this chaotic and challenging situation, it is not illogical that Italian people distrust both 
European and national political institutions. Europe used to mean wealth, peace and civilization 
for Italians after WWII, and support for European integration has always been particularly high 
in Italy (Eurobarometer, 2013)
4
. The recession, the austerity measures and the experience of a 
                                                          
4
 Data from Eurobarometer, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb80/eb80_publ_en.pdf  page 75 and 
following. 
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lack of solidarity among the member states have changed the way Italians look at the EU. One of 
the latest polls says that just 32% of Italian trust the European Union. In the matter of internal 
institutions, data are even more dramatic: less than 10% of Italian have confidence in the national 
Parliament and in political parties (Demos, 2013). 
 
2.6.2 Economic Contextual Factors that Account for the Success of 5SM 
The success of the 5SM was clearly rooted in the economic context that has existed in Italy and 
Europe during the past decade, and particularly the economic and financial crises they faced that 
are explained in this section of the thesis.  The objective in this subsection is to briefly discuss 
each of those two contexts.  
 
2.6.2.1 The Economic Context in Italy 
From a macroeconomic point of view, Italy is a nation with a big public debt (about 130% of 
GDP) and a fast aging population. For these reasons insufficient economic growth and a lack of 
more efficient policies on immigration can significantly endanger the sustainability of the entire 
social security system in the medium term.     
To understand the seriousness of the Italian economic situation after the last recession it 
is necessary to consider a 14-year period. From to 2001 to 2007, unlike other European 
countries, Italian GDP did not grow in a significant way, so the recent slump hit an economic 
system that had been already struck by years of stagnation. No wonder, then, that GDP per capita 
in 2013 – at the end of the period - has fallen back to the level of 1997 ("Il Pil italiano torna ai 
livelli del 1997",  2013).  
The numbers are dramatic. The unemployment rate at the end of 2013 was 12.5%, with 
3.2 million unemployed (Istat, 2013). To this figure we should add about 500,000 workers who 
did not work but received a social-insurance paycheck (Cgil, 2014) (the name of the program is 
“Cassa di Integrazione”) and are not counted as unemployed by ISTAT, the Italian statistic 
center. The youth unemployment rate is 41.3%, and there are about 3.7 million people between 
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15 and 35 years of age who are not in education, employment or training ("Istat, 3,7 milioni non 
studiano e non lavorano, 2013). The consumption rate regressed to the level of 40 years ago 
("Istat, cala ancora il potere d'acquisto delle famiglie", 2014) and the real estate sector 
experienced a deep downturn as well ("Sondaggio Bankitalia: Il mercato immibiliare resta 
debole", 2014). The banking system, as reported before, is trying to solve its huge problem of 
undercapitalization and, therefore, it is reluctant to lend money to business or private citizens 
(CGIA Mestre, 2014). 
The Italian economic system has several structural issues that have worsened in the last 
15 years: high tax evasion, widespread corruption (European Union, 2014), lack of internal 
economic competition and lack of competitiveness (World Economic Forum, 2013). During the 
economic crisis the EU urged the Italian government to reform its pension system and to cut 
public expenditure but did not demand immediate actions on these issues. This probably explains 
why Italian people now have such a bad opinion of EU Institutions: they imposed sacrifices on 
ordinary people but they did not recommend an effective program to deal with rent-seekers, 
conflict of interests, tax evaders, rich real estate owners and corrupted elites.         
 In Italy, as in several other European countries, the economic crisis and the lack of a 
strong common European response have caused a widespread deterioration of the confidence in 
European institutions. The lack of real integration among the member states has emerged, and 
this turned out to be especially related to a too feeble feeling of solidarity among different 
European peoples. The discussion, including scholarly debate about Eurobonds as a way to solve 
the problems of the debt crisis, has not succeeded in convincing neither the governments nor 
voters of the richest states of the Union that such a solution can produce benefit for all the 
European countries. 
 
2.6.2.2 The Economic Context in Europe  
The economic context Italy during the past decade that contributed to the emergence and 
electoral success of the 5SM cannot be understood in isolation from the broader economic 
context of Europe during that period.  Of particular importance are the recession and debt crisis, 
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the banking crisis, the austerity measures, and the economic imbalances between European 
countries.   
 
2.6.2.3 The European Recession and the Debt Crisis 
In 2007-2008 the western world was hit by a recession that had originated in the United States. 
In Italy and in other Southern European countries there was a rise in unemployment rates and 
households were forced to cut their consumption levels, leading to a fall in aggregate demand. In 
2010, while the US and the countries of northern Europe experienced a weak economic recovery, 
the states of the south of Europe began to see financial speculation concentrate on their sovereign 
bonds. The spread of the yields between the Greek, Irish, Portuguese, Spanish and Italian bonds, 
on the one hand, and those of Germany (the most solid economy in Europe), on the other, 
skyrocketed in a brief period of time.  
 The ECB and the EU had to act to avoid the sovereign default of these states. The 
procedures followed were different depending on the depth of the financial difficulties of the 
states, but the logic followed was the same: states were required to cut their social programs to 
improve their financial balance and in the return they would receive the financial help from the 
EU and the ECB in the form of massive purchases of national bonds. These have been called ‘the 
austerity measures’.  
In that period European public debate was focused on the excess of expenditure in the 
social systems of the southern European countries, especially of Greece and Italy. The 
hypertrophic dimension of the public sector in Greece and the generous salaries of (often 
corrupt) Italian politicians were two famous examples that have become very popular in Europe. 
So, austerity was conceived as a way to restore virtue on peoples that had been profligate and 
lazy and who had too long tolerated corruption.  
Europe has seen a growing cleavage between north European states (Germany, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Finland) and the southern European states; the former  wanted austerity 
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measures to be enacted in order to avoid having to spend money for future bailouts of their 
southern partners in the EU; the latter asked for ways to avoid excessive pain for their 
populations. Austerity became popular among north European peoples and became hideous and 
detested among southern Europeans. This idea and the policies it inspired had terrible economic 
and social consequences, and fell abundantly short in achieving even the primary goal of 
reducing the burden of public debts. 
        
2.6.2.4 The Banking Crisis in Europe 
The current economic crisis exploded in 2008, after the Lehman Brothers meltdown and the 
financial crisis in the USA. The crisis of the American banks soon became a global problem, 
affecting many banks in the Eurozone. Some of these banks eventually had to be bailed out by 
the state, leading to an increased public debt in many European countries and contributing to a 
crisis of confidence that led the system to the verge of collapse. The bank crises in Europe have 
had very heavy consequences on the economy because of the undercapitalization of many of 
these financial institutions. The dimension of the potential losses was so big that it is possible to 
say that while American banks were said to be too big to fail, we could consider European banks 
too big to bail (Blyth, 2013).  
The situation of the European banks was much worse than that of American banks. The 
top six US banks, added together, had in 2008 assets of about 61% of national GDP. In the same 
period “the top three French banks had asset foot-print of 316% of France’s GDP.....the top two 
German banks had assets equal to 114% of German GDP.... the top three Italian banks 
constituted… 115% of GDP” (p.83) and “the top four UK banks had a combined asset footprint 
of 394% of UK GDP”( p. 83). 
In Spain and Portugal the situation was no better. Highly leveraged banks which were 
literally too big to be bailed out were, and is still are, the biggest economic problem for the EU 
economy. In 2010-2011 a lack of confidence and a credit crunch among the banks was looming. 
Thus the ECB devised the LTRO (Long term re-financing operation) extraordinary lending 
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programs to give the banks temporary relief and to ameliorate the situation of the national bond 
markets (through massive purchases from the banks). But despite the fact that the banks acquired 
a huge quantity of their own nation’s debt, the yields of national bonds still tended to go up.   
The situation of the EU’s banks was really much more tragic than that of the US’s banks, 
consequently there were not enough funds in the states’ national balances to absorb the shock of 
a possible breakdown. Recently, an agreement has been reached at the Economic and Financial 
Affairs Council (ECOFIN) to manage bank failures in the EU, but this just slightly improved the 
overall situation.  
 EU banks are deleveraging (Wehinger, 2012) but not at a fast rate (Brierley & Safraz, 
2013). The fear of the need to inject public money into sick banks is still very high among 
officials. This is probably the main reason for austerity: keeping resources available to avoid 
sudden bank collapses. This “truth” is difficult to tell to the public of the different countries, for 
the obvious reason that people would not be willing to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the 
banks.  This is particularly true in some counties in which the people are feeling the adverse 
effects of the banking crises as well as other crises more acutely than their counterparts in other 
countries. 
 
2.6.2.5 The Austerity Measures in Europe 
Austerity measures were requested by the “Troika” EU-IMF-ECB5 of the states whose bonds 
were hit by financial speculation in the period 2009-2013. They consisted essentially in cutting 
the public deficit by cutting public jobs and social expenditure and by increasing taxes. These 
                                                          
5
 The so-called “Troika” is an informal entity in charge of control over the balance of the states in financial distress, 
and is composed by the European Union, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank. 
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measures were aimed at achieving the result of showing the investors these states’ renewed 
ability to meet their financial commitments.  
Nevertheless, the economic situation of the states that were exposed to these “neoliberal” 
austerity measures worsened in a very dramatic way (Quigging, 2010). The recession sharpened 
in Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal. Their unemployment rates got higher and consumption 
decreased to reach its lowest level in thirty or forty years. The crisis has also damaged the health 
care systems (Karanikolos and al. 2013) of these states, threatening even the basic needs of 
existence. And the most important evidence of the failure is that the sustainability of the public 
finances of the southern European states is still at risk: in fact the most important indicator, the 
debt to GDP ratio, has worsened in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, and it is on the rise also in 
Ireland (Kelpie, 2013).   
The austerity doctrine’s supporters and in particular many moderate conservative parties 
of the north of the Eurozone characterize the public debt crisis in a way that has some elements 
that are typical of populist rhetoric. In particular, pitting north European virtuous countries 
against south European profligate countries is an element of oversimplification that also creates a 
strong contraposition between good and evil that is typical of populist discourse. Even if these 
parties do not have all the other characteristics to be called populist (they do not rely upon 
heightened or violent emotions of their constituencies and they do not have a mainly charismatic 
relationship between the leaders and the people), the doctrine they support is dangerous because 
it fails to represent to their constituency the real dimension of the problems that the north 
European countries also face, albeit to a lesser degree. This depletes the public debate and can set 
the stage for the rise of populist movements.  
 What went wrong since the beginning in the Eurozone is not reducible to a simple 
dichotomy between prudence and profligacy. The dynamic of capital flows resulting from the 
creation of the European common currency and their effects on various counties is summarized 
cogently by Paul Krugman (2013): 
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The first effect of the euro was an outbreak of europhoria: suddenly, investors believed 
that all European debt was equally safe. Interest rates dropped all around the European 
periphery, setting off huge flows of capital to Spain and other economies; these capital 
flows fed huge housing bubbles in many places, and in general created booms in the 
countries receiving the inflows. The booms, in turn, caused differential inflation: costs 
and prices rose much more in the periphery than in the core. Peripheral economies 
became increasingly uncompetitive, which was not a problem as long as the inflow-
fueled bubbles lasted, but would become a problem once the capital inflows stopped. 
  
Most EU nations had increases in labor costs (Fatas, 2012) greater than Germany's. Germany, 
instead, managed to restrain its labor costs and had a positive export balance in the following 
years.  Those nations that allowed "wages to grow faster than productivity" (Emsden, 2012) lost 
competitiveness. 
 When the inflow of capital to the south of Europe stopped after the financial crisis, the 
result was that there were highly uncompetitive states (not able to export enough), with an 
internal demand that started to get very weak. As a result, there was a need for a devaluation of 
the currency, but those countries no longer had their own currency because of their membership 
in the Eurozone. The way of “internal devaluation”, that is cutting social programs as well as the 
cost of labour, is very unpopular and slow and difficult to achieve in a fair and balanced way. 
 
 2.6.2.6 Lack of Solidarity and Integration in Europe 
The austerity measures contributed to crisis of legitimacy faced by the European Union. 
Austerity measures and prolonged recession had undermined the so-called “outcome-legitimacy”: 
the notion that “so long as the common project produced evident benefits in the form of 
prosperity, economic opportunities and job creation, voters would accept it” ("An ever deeper 
democratic deficit", 2012).                                  The institutional structure of the Union was not 
able to help the undermining of this equation. In the words of one observe of the continental 
economic situation at that time, the European Parliament “has increased its powers with every 
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EU treaty, including the fiscal compact; but has seen no parallel growth in its legitimacy” ("An 
ever deeper democratic deficit", 2012) .  
 In the European commission
6
 and in national capitals alike, frustration with the EU 
parliament has been growing. It is almost always in favour of new regulation and always in 
favour of more spending. Any claim that this is what the voters want is undermined by the fact 
that the voters show ever less interest in it. At every election for the European Parliament since 
1979, the turnout across the continent has plumbed a new low" (An ever deeper democratic 
deficit, 2012), while national elections registered a general increasing turnout. 
The limitation in the power of the ECB, that is not allowed to lend money directly to the 
states nor to interfere in the economy to reduce unemployment like the American Federal 
Reserve, engenders among the peoples a sense of general frustration when they compare its 
functions to the functions the national central banks were able to perform before. Moreover The 
European Union seems to miss a demos (Grewal, 2012), a popular basis that feels European as 
well as German, Italian, French. To reduce this elitist kind of a representational deficit (Bellamy 
& Kroeger, 2013) there are many proposals by numerous scholars to enlarge common functions 
and to further the procedure to build other forms of common government and of common 
representation.  
The role of Germany (Beck, 2013) as the de facto leading state in the Union, and the lack 
of willingness of its people to fully accept and take on this role, created a situation in which 
European elites did not seem to know which direction to take. T. Garton Ash (2013) explains that 
there are historical reasons that justify this German attitude. Germans, in fact, did not want to 
give up their own currency and they never chose to shape the EU in this way. France and Italy 
pushed Germany to agree to this common currency, but refused to integrate further in parallel 
with monetary integration. So it is unfair to blame the Germans for taking advantage of the 
monetary union in the bond market (attracting capital form the south of Europe) and for their 
                                                          
6
 The European Commission is the Executive body of the EU, sometimes referred to as European government. 
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export surplus (having a weaker currency than the Deutsche Mark would have been), as they had 
to adjust to conditions they did not impose, and that they did not ask for.   
Many scholars have advocated a major revision of the treaties, and the proposals are 
diverse. Some would try to involve the people directly in the election of the president of the 
commission, or even in the election of the entire commission; others would like to increase the 
powers of the national government in influencing the choices of the union; others again 
concentrate mainly on the economic reform of the ECB and on the communalization of national 
debts (Gallino, 2013). In May 2015 European elections will take place, and at the moment the 
polls register a huge growth of anti-European populist parties in many countries (Brown, 2014). 
The protest against austerity in many cases blends with old nationalism and regionalism. 
 Regardless of their precise effects and what other factors may be considered important, it 
is clear that the economic crises within Italy and the European Union had a significant effect on 
economic management, governance and electoral politics in Italy. Of particular importance for 
this thesis, is the effect they had on the emergence and electoral success of the 5SM. 
 
2.7 Summary 
 
The chapter has provided an explanation of the emergence and success of the 5SM within the 
Italian political system. The chapter reveals that the emergence and success of the 5SM are 
attributable to a combination of economic and political and factors and the capacity of its 
principal agents (i.e., Grillo and Casaleggio).  
 The major economic factor was the harsh economic recession in Italy that worsened as a 
result of European austerity policies and the inability of the European Union to make much 
progress in dealing with them. That problem was compounded by the fact that during that time, 
after years of bad governance and public management, the political system was once again in a 
chaotic state and policy and decision-making had reached an impasse. These economic and 
political crises led citizens to lose confidence in both the Italian and the European political and 
financial institutions to the point where it reached one of lowest levels in the postwar period. 
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Grillo and Casaleggio managed to exploit this discontent through a strong anti-establishment 
message and, as explained in more detail in the next chapter, the mobilization of ideas and 
individuals through the effective use of the internet and other media. 
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CHAPTER 3: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 5SM 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the main characteristics of the 5SM as a political entity. The analysis is 
focused on the organizational structure, the internal governance processes and dynamics, and 
some of the strategies both in the ‘political/parliamentary arena’ and also in the ‘policy arena’.  In 
examining the major strategies in the ‘political/parliamentary arena’ the focus is on the way it 
positions itself within that area vis-à-vis other national parties. In examining the major strategies 
in the ‘policy arena’ the focus is on three notable policies positions —institutional reform policy, 
environmental policy, and European Union policy.  
 
3.2 The Organizational Structure of 5SM 
 
The 5SM is a very ‘flat’ rather than a very “hierarchic” organization.  Both in theory and in 
practice it operates with two levels in the hierarchy—the singular and centralized leadership and 
the widely dispersed and diverse grassroots membership. The leadership consists only of Grillo. 
The grassroots consists of several categories of members dispersed across communities and 
connected by the Grillo’s blog. The first major category includes two sub-categories of blog 
followers: one sub-category consists of non-voting members and the other consists of voting 
members. Both groups are allowed to follow and comment on Grillo’s posts on the 5SM website. 
However, only the accredited voting members are allowed to vote in the online 
plebiscites/referenda.  
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The second major category of members includes what might be termed political activists 
who participate in local campaigns, such as the ‘Meet-up group’ participants who organize 
petitions, local events, debates among citizens and public protests. Many of them are certified 
activists who are authorized to participate in the 5SM’s online referenda. There are no public 
registers where one can verify the numbers of accredited members so the available data are based 
on Grillo’s and Casaleggio’s statements.  
Although the most apparent differences from traditional parties are the lack of “physical” 
headquarters and the concentration of the bulk of its political interactions on the blog, the most 
significant structural difference between them is that the 5SM does not have layers of leadership 
between the national leaders and grassroots members at the local and regional levels. More 
specifically, whereas traditional parties have locally and regionally elected leaders who 
participate in the activities of local and regional party councils or assemblies and contribute to 
the internal organization of the party, the local and regional politicians elected for the 5SM do 
not have a say regarding the management of their organization.  
In the 5SM, neither the non-elected members nor the elected members in the local, 
regional and national legislatures are allowed to criticize the official positions decide by Grillo 
and Casaleggio. Indeed, as explained below, elected candidates from the 5SM lists who have 
criticized Grillo's positions publicly have been expelled from the movement.  The 5SM 
leadership asserts that this centralized structure is aimed at preventing the institutionalization of 
hierarchy, and avoiding the exploitation of the 5SM brand by individuals exclusively interested 
in their personal political career. Actually, given the heterogeneous composition of its 
constituency, it is evident that what Grillo fears is the formation of internal factions led by 
prominent members, which can make the movement unmanageable or even cause its dissolution. 
The major linking mechanism between the leadership and grassroots membership of the 
5SM is the Internet. The 5SM website is acknowledged to be the linking mechanism between the 
leadership and the grassroots, and a prime tool in the consultations, deliberations, decisions of 
the 5SM as well as for the selection and campaigns of 5SM candidates for national, regional and 
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local elections. These are organized through the Internet ("Non statute", 2009). More 
specifically, the website (www.beppegrillo.it) is used to the identify and select candidates who 
support campaigns for social, cultural, and political awareness, which reflect the goal articulated 
by Grillo, and also to facilitate the work of the 5SM’s "Meetup" groups, the public 
demonstrations, and the certified “Civic Lists".  
Grillo used online consultation for different purposes: to decide what people are to be 
presented as candidates in the national elections, to decide 5SM's candidate for President of the 
Republic, to decide what position was to be taken regarding illegal immigration, to decide 
whether Grillo should go to meet the Prime Minister, to decide what electoral system was to be 
supported in Parliament and to decide whether to expel some elected MPs who were at odds with 
Grillo's official positions. 
First, in these online consultations only people who had been registered on the blog for at 
least six months and whose identity had been verified are allowed to participate. At the moment, 
there are about 500,000 people ("Grillo, il M5S ha mezzo milione di iscritti, siamo democratici", 
2014) registered on the website and the number of citizens who can vote in these consultations is 
about 80,000 to 100,000 ("Risultato della votazione sul reato di clandestinità, 2014). Second, 
these consultations are managed by Casaleggio's company, which decides when to announce the 
consultations, when they are to take place, what phrasing to adopt to formulate the alternatives 
and who is in charge of counting the votes and disclosing the results. Third, the vote is not secret, 
because the company that manages the blog can identify the participants and their vote. Fourth, 
the announced results cannot be verified either by the 5SM’s activists or by external observers. 
One criticism that has been made about this procedure is that the issues submitted for 
consultation are not of fundamental importance. For instance, Grillo did not ask its supporters 
whether to try to align with the Democratic Party (PD) to form a government that could enact 
some reforms supported by both parties, and he did not ask people whether to participate in the 
discussion about constitutional amendments with the other parties. Moreover, Grillo always tries 
to influence his supporters by clearly and forcefully stating his positions before the consultations. 
The only issue in which the majority of online voters opposed Grillo's decision was on 
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decriminalization of illegal immigration. Whereas Grillo had declared that it should not be 
decriminalized, the majority of 5SM supporters voted in favor of decriminalizing it, thereby 
aligning the movement with the position of the center-left parties on this controversial issue. 
Grillo’s and Casaleggio’s narrative describes the Internet as a tool that allows a horizontal 
and democratic interactions among the users. The new modes of communication offered by the 
web is different from traditional media like TV and newspapers that are doomed to disappear. 
Similarly, the 5SM represents a new way of doing politics as it relies on the new media system; 
this movement will overthrow the old party system that is based the vertical communication of 
the old media. Cyber utopian views like this share two things: first, the “cultural myth” about the 
web, which will kill the old media as a consequence of inevitable technological progress; and 
second, the assumption that human progress tends inevitably to more democracy, human rights 
and political participation.   
The scholar Morozov (2011) demonstrated that the effects of Internet diffusion in many 
countries of the world have very rarely brought about real and lasting improvements in peoples’ 
freedom. Therefore, the general unequivocal tendency towards more democracy and a more 
horizontal, egalitarian structure of power, which is described by cyber-utopians, has not been 
observed at all. Indeed, several authors depict web communication in a quite different way from 
the simplistic vision of the 5SM leaders. They argue that there is a tendency towards 
centralization and concentration in web interactions, therefore, whether it is theoretically true 
that every source has the same ability to reach many users, in practice there are very few actors 
really able to do so.  
Miconi (2014) recently discussed the most important studies on the structure of the web, 
and delved into the analysis of Italy’s particular web structure as well as interactions within 
Grillo’s blog. He observed that the structure of Grillo’s blog and its internal dynamics are very 
centralized, rather than horizontal and pluralistic. Similarly, Miconi described Grillo’s leadership 
as a case of Weberian “charismatic authority” and argues it is the result of the combination of the 
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web’s centralizing tendency and an Italian social-cultural trend towards traditional family-style 
authority. 
Corbetta & Vignati (2013) confirmed that in 5SM’s internal dynamics, “the Internet has 
so far proved inefficient in ensuring the participation of the movement’s adherents”( p. 60). 
Moreover, he denounced an evident lack of transparency in the management of online 
consultations the 5SM undertook. Mosca (2014) observed that “the 5SM adopted some of the 
tactical innovations introduced by Moveon
7
: a small coordinating staff, no offices, use of the 
Internet for organizational purposes, decision-making and fund raising” (p. 40). Nevertheless, he 
stated that while Moveon relies upon “an open and inclusive model”, the 5SM puts several 
“barriers to participation”, excluding members of political parties and allowing to vote in online 
consultations only people who were already registered on the blog for several months. 
Grillo demonstrates that he is aware of the limitations of web communication. Indeed he 
recently changed his mind on the participation of 5SM MPs in TV broadcasts. As Diamanti 
(2014) pointed out, “Grillo exploits TV to his own advantage, pushing the lever of 
communication to ‘full on’ when an election is in sight” (p. 8). So, in spite of the cyber-utopia 
and the alleged imminent death of traditional media, the 5SM already employs a ‘hybrid’ 
communication strategy (see Chadwick, 2013), taking into account the complex interplay 
between diverse sources of information.   
 
                                                          
7
 Moveon is a non-profit, progressive advocacy group that raise money and organize public campaign for 
progressive or liberal candidates in American electoral campaigns. This group, as well, organizes petitions and 
promotes active participation of citizens in political life. See  http://front.moveon.org/about/#.U6J6-tJdUeg 
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3.3 The internal governance of the 5SM 
 
When one focuses on the internal governance of the 5SM there is a substantial difference 
between the rhetoric and the reality. Grillo likes to depict the 5SM as a loosely structured and 
highly egalitarian and democratic organization. In practice, however, it is much more centralized 
and substantially less egalitarian and democratic than in his depiction. Michel’s “iron law of 
oligarchy” (1915), regarding the ubiquity of rule by a few in all organizations applies as much to 
the 5SM as does to any other movement or party.  This is evident in the rules that it has 
established, the way it deals with internal governance issues, its decision-making and policy-
making processes, and also in the way it treats members who dissent from the leadership’s 
positions on various issues. These features of the 5SM are discussed, in turn, below. 
The rhetoric of the 5SM regarding its egalitarian and democratic features is embodied in 
its bylaws, which are curiously referred to as the ‘non-statute’ in its documents. The ‘non-statute’ 
of 5SM states that it will be governed and guided by the collective wisdom of its supporters. In 
this regard, the ‘non-statute’ states that: “The ‘5 Stars Movement’ will gather the experience 
gained through the blog found at ‘www.beppegrillo.it’, the ‘Meetup’ groups, the public 
demonstrations and other initiatives and the certified ‘Civic Lists’ ”.  
In practice, however, the authority and autonomy of the grassroots is very limited. 
Instead, organizational authority is highly concentrated in Grillo and to some extent also in 
Casaleggio. They are the ones who have the authority and autonomy (i.e., the power) to 
determine the composition of “certified lists. They are the ones who manage the internet blog, 
regardless of the views of the majority of their supporters, who declare through their internet 
blog which lists, groups, or individuals are to be included and supported within the movement. 
There is neither highly systematized and democratic decision-making process nor a legitimate 
and properly established decision-making panel(s). Instead, Grillo, as the owner of the Logo and 
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the blog
8
, is the one who decides on the composition of lists, candidacy for political offices, and 
which groups or individuals can use the 5SM brand for any political purposes.  
The recent case of the February 2014 Sardinia’s regional elections perfectly illustrates this 
paradox. Competing local lists asked Grillo to use the logo to participate in the elections 
("Sardinia general elections without the M5S", 2014). Since these lists were incapable of 
reaching an agreement between them, Grillo decided that the 5SM would not take part in that 
electoral contest. Recognizing that he might be accused of centralization of decision-making 
authority within the movement, he posted a declaration related to this matter in which he held out 
the hope for democratic decision-making by stating that in future the 5SM would let its 
supporters decide such matters through an online local consultation ("Elezioni generali in 
Sardegna", 2014). 
The 5SM demands substantial obedience and loyalty from its members. Members who 
are not loyal or obedient face expulsion based on decisions made by Grillo. This approach 
applies not only for members seeking or holding electoral posts within the Italian political 
system, but also for other members who are not seeking or holding such posts. In effect he can 
bar them from being part of the movement without approval by anyone else. It is possible for 
him to do this legally because Section 3 of the 5SM’s “non-statute” (i.e., bylaws) state that: “The 
name of the “ '5 Stars Movement' is connected to a trademark registered on behalf of Beppe 
Grillo, the sole owner of the rights of use it" ("Non- statute", 2009). Legally, therefore, Grillo has 
the right to prevent anyone from using the 5SM logo and brand for political purposes even in 
claiming that they are members of the 5SM. 
 Grillo recognizes that if he made too many decisions on his own regarding expulsions 
without some input by members, he might be accused of operating too much contrary to the 
spirit of democratic governance and would be criticized both within and outside the 5SM. 
Consequently, in an effort to at least give the semblance that some element of direct democracy 
                                                          
8
 According to article number 4 of the non statute: “The name of the “5 Stars Movement” is connected to a 
trademark registered on behalf of Beppe Grillo, the sole owner of the rights of use”. 
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exists, he has used some deliberative or consultative procedures in dealing with expulsions. To 
date this procedure has not been precisely defined, but the last expulsion of elected officials 
started with a vote of the “Meet-up groups” in the ridings of the elected officials, continued with 
the vote of the assembly of all elected 5SM MPs and finally was ratified by a national 
referendum on the blog. 
The expulsions have been frequent since the 5SM started electing people to local 
councils. From the first session of the Parliament until March 2014 (about one year in total), 
thirteen 5SM senators (out of 54) and about ten deputies (out of 109) were expelled or 
abandoned the 5SM after conflicts with Grillo’s official line. These numbers reveal how high the 
tension is inside the movement and how difficult it is for Grillo to keep the MPs disciplined and 
abiding by official political choices and positions. The first expulsion was that of Valentino 
Tavolazzi, a municipal councilor in Ferrara, who was guilty of participating at a convention 
summoned by some 5SM activists to discuss the organization of the 5SM (“Ferrara, Consigliere 
comunale primo espulso dal M5S”, 2012).  
It was March 2012 and the movement was on the rise. This blatant expulsion did not 
damage the 5SM’s ability to attract voters. A few months later, in October, Federica Salsi, a 
municipal councilor in Bologna, was expelled for participating in a TV talk-show on political 
matters. Grillo expelled her because he felt that such TV broadcasts could damage the movement 
because TV journalists are biased against the 5SM and are committed to damaging its image. 
After eighteen months Grillo would change his opinion about participation in TV broadcasts. 
In December 2012, the most famous and widely discussed expulsion took place ("M5S, 
Grillo caccia Giovanni Favia e Federica Salsi", 2012). Giovanni Favia, a regional councilor in 
Emilia Romagna, was recorded, without his consent, while talking to a journalist about the 
problems of democracy within the 5SM (“Federica Salsi vs Beppe Grillo: ecco la lettera di 
espulsione”, 2012). According to Favia, the movement was not democratic, as the Grillo-
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Casaleggio duopoly controlled all activities, decisions and policies. Since then, there have been 
several 5SM "purges" all over Italy, in almost all regions and in many municipal councils. 
In summary, expulsion can result from the misuse of the symbol
9
, participation in TV 
broadcasts or – in the majority of the cases - public disagreement with Grillo’s political line. In 
any case, it is evident that Grillo does not tolerate the emergence of distinguished personalities 
who can discuss and criticize his statements and political choices. The comedian explains this 
approach as necessary to defend the movement form the many enemies that surround it ("Grillo, 
fuori dalle palle chi accusa me e Casaleggio", 2012). These enemies are the traditional political 
parties, but also the financial interests that are linked to them as well as the media that contribute 
to maintaining their power.  
This “wartime” psychology, so widespread among activists and elected representatives of 
the 5SM, implies generalized suspicions as well as an elevated fear of conspiracies and 
intrusions. This almost paranoid psychological attitude leads Grillo to dismiss every criticism as 
triggered by ulterior motives. The journalists, politicians and scholars who criticize the 5SM, 
including those who previously had been appreciated by Grillo, are treated as dishonest enemies 
who are ferociously criticized and condemned. 
 
3.4 The Strategies of the 5SM 
 
To reiterate, the objective in this sub-section is to provide a brief overview of the political 
strategies of the 5SM both in the ‘political/parliamentary arena’ and in the ‘policy arena’.  In 
examining the major strategies in the ‘political/parliamentary arena’ the focus is on the way it 
                                                          
9
 ‘Misuse of the symbol’ is a very broad and vague concept. It is arguable that what Grillo wants to forbid is that 
elected councilors or MPs declare that the 5SM support some causes without the consent of the supporters (and 
especially of the founders), or that they use the symbol just to gain popularity. 
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positions itself within that arena vis-à-vis other national parties. In examining the major 
strategies in the ‘policy arena’ the focus is on three notable policies positions—institutional 
reform policy, environmental policy, and European Union policy. 
 
3.4.1 Strategy in the Political/Parliamentary Arena 
The 5SM's main strategy within the political/parliamentary arena might be described as 'non-
alignment' and 'anti-coalitionist'. This is quite evident in the fact that after the 2013 national 
elections Grillo refused to align with the PD to form a government that could definitively 
transcend the Berlusconi era, and preferred to stay in opposition. This refusal forced the PD to 
form a government in coalition with Bersluconi’s party and put the 5SM in a convenient position 
whereby it could criticize the “caste of politicians” and thus reinforce its uncompromising anti-
establishment profile. This choice led to strong opposition to almost every act the government 
proposed.  
The protest was put forward in a very resounding way, trying to give the media the image 
of a very extreme and desperate fight for freedom against an undemocratic regime. Nevertheless, 
this attitude was at odds with the opinion of many 5SM MPs who thought that it was better to 
cooperate with the government to improve the situation of the country incrementally. This led to 
conflicts within the movement that were eventually solved with the expulsion of many MPs. 
Moreover, this strategy probably also led to a decrease in popular consensus, as in local election 
in April and June 2013 the 5SM got very bad results compared to the great success of February 
2013. 
Grillo’s efforts to avoid even the semblance of being aligned with or supporting any other 
party or party leader was clearly evident in February 2014 when the Democratic Party decided to 
replace prime minster Enrico Letta with Matteo Renzi. The other parties followed the tradition, 
and met the new prime minster to discuss his political plans.  
Grillo, however, did not want to meet Renzi ostensibly because he thought it was just a 
waste of time. Nevertheless, he asked his supporters through an online consultation whether he 
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had to accept the invitation. The majority of 5SM followers voted against Grillo’s position on 
this matter, urging him to meet the prime minster. Grillo went to the meeting, which was 
broadcast via streaming (Cinquestelle Milano, 2014). However, rather than having a congenial 
conversation, he used the opportunity to assail Renzi with strong and torrential invective that 
prevented Renzi from speaking for even one minute ("Anti-elite activist Grillo lambasts Italy 
PM-designate Renzi", 2014).  
The philosophy of non-cooperation and non-alignment within the political/parliamentary 
sphere continued as a mainstay of the 5SM’s political strategy in other aspects of parliamentary 
business related to some major reform proposals. In September 2013, for example, the 5SM 
opposed a proposed reform to the national constitution’s amendment rules.  In opposing that 
proposed reform of the constitution, 12 5SM MPs climbed on the roof of the Chamber of 
Deputies, and remained there for more than 24 hours ("M5S, dodici parlamentari occupano il 
tetto di Montecitorio", 2013). Many commentators characterized this action as an exuberant 
though useless protest. Nevertheless, it was appreciated by other more left-leaning observers, 
because that constitutional amendment affected the method for amending the constitution, and 
the change proposed would have rendered the fundamental law too easy to amend in future. 
The 5SM also adopted a non-cooperation and anti-reform stance in relation to 
restructuring Italy’s central bank. In January 2014, the 5SM filibustered a decree for a 
fundamental restructuring of the Italian central bank entailing a reevaluation of its assets. Since 
the time for the conversion was almost over, the President of the House decided to enact a very 
unusual – though legitimate – measure that abruptly ended the debate (de facto neutralizing 
filibustering). The 5SM’s MPs protested in Parliament against this action, that they deemed anti-
democratic, in a very disrespectful and chaotic way, which included insulting the President 
("Imu-bankitalia è legge. Proteste", 2014). 
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3.4.2 Strategies in the 'Political Sphere' 
The strategies of the 5SM within the ‘policy sphere’ also reveal a strong tendency to avoid 
seeming closely aligned with any other parties, and they also echo a combination of good 
governance and public management themes, anti-establishment themes, nationalism themes, pro-
environmental themes, and digital democracy themes.
10
 In the case of the pro-digital democracy 
theme the movement promotes the direct participation of citizens in the management of public 
affairs through the use of “digital democracy” (Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2013). These themes are 
evident in numerous policy positions, including the three discussed below: institutional reform 
policy, European integration policy, and social and environmental policy.  
 
 3.4.2.1 Institutional Reform Policy of the 5SM 
The 5SM has a broad and vague institutional reform policy. It is one that is heavy on rhetorical 
criticism and short on substantive details. The 5SM feels that the failures of Italy are largely a 
function of the failures of its established political and economic institutions. This is quite evident 
in its anti-establishment rhetoric that prevails in its oral and written communications.  
 Among the primary targets in those colorful and vitriolic rhetorical attacks are parties and 
parliament.  Few institutions, including unions, are immune from his attacks. In 2013, Grillo had 
this to say about the unions: "I want a State with balls, eliminate the unions, which are an old 
structure like political parties. There is no longer a need for unions. Companies must be owned 
by those who work in them" ("Grillo, eliminiamo i sindacati", 2013). 
Grillo maintains that Italy suffers from a political and economic crisis caused by the 
political parties that still form the country’s government and control the national parliament and 
                                                          
10
 The program of the 5SM can be found at the link 
http://www.beppegrillo.it/iniziative/movimentocinquestelle/Programma-Movimento-5-Stelle.pdf 
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regional and local assemblies. For the 5SM the right-wing parties and the left-wing parties are 
essentially the same and equally at fault. The 5SM indicates that they represent the interest of 
political and economic elites in defiance of the general interest of the people. These parties are to 
blame individually and collectively for the impoverishment of the country. The 5SM accuses 
members of those parties of stealing a considerable amount of public resources with cynical 
indifference to millions of poor and unemployed people.   
What is noteworthy and important regarding these anti-establishment messages vitriolic 
and offensive manner in which they are communicated. The 5SM disparages its political enemies 
through mangled names, satirical jokes and sometimes even through direct insults (Bordignon 
and Ceccarini 2013). Grillo talks about politics –as the de facto leader of a big political 
movement - the same way he used to talk about it as a comedian: his style was not temperate at 
all, and he often had to face trials for defamation. In three cases he was found guilty and had to 
compensate the victims of his invectives economically ("Tutti i guai giudiziari di Grillo", 2014).  
In distancing themselves from the established parties, Grillo and his supporters firmly 
declare that the 5SM is not a political party, it is rather a movement made up of citizens who 
want to restore democracy as prescribed by the Italian Constitution; that in the 5SM there is no 
leader, there is no hierarchy (the motto is “one weighs as one”) as it is simply an association of 
citizens; that the founder Beppe Grillo in not a political leader (in fact he chose to stay out of 
Parliament) but simply “the megaphone” of the movement (Biorcio & Natale, 2013). Grillo 
depicts the 5SM as an agent of progress and modernization. He believes that the political change 
that will result in less reliance on parties and parliament(s) will be brought about through the 
effective use of the internet as the key instrument of political communication.  
To promote direct political participation of citizens, Grillo and Casaleggio advocate 
greater reliance on web-based plebiscites and referenda. To enhance free thought and true 
democracy they also call for an independent media system. For that reason they advocate an end 
to public subsidies to newspapers and a radical reform in granting access to airwave frequencies 
(in a way that prevents excessive concentration). Grillo is firmly convinced that citizens can 
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access fair and balanced information through the internet, therefore he calls for an improvement 
of the internet infrastructure to increase the scope and speed of connection to all the citizens of 
the country. 
Grillo and Casaleggio believe that the traditional instruments of representative democracy 
are not compatible with the principle of popular sovereignty, so they have proposed a major 
overhaul of mechanisms of representation. Toward that end, the 5SM's program calls for the 
abolition of the prohibition of a binding mandate, as provided by the Constitution, and the 
introduction of mandatory instructions for the elected. The MPs’ duty should be limited to 
implementing the electoral program approved by voters.  
Recently, Grillo proposed the mechanism of recall (La7 attualita, 2014; Biorcio, 2014): 
each candidate must sign a contract that will oblige him to pay a fine of 250,000 Euro if he 
refuses to resign after an assembly in his district votes to dismiss him. Grillo and Casaleggio 
believe that as web technologies develop, citizens will no longer need the mediation of parties or 
politicians to manage the affairs of the state. Therefore Grillo talks about existing political 
parties and unions as “dead” or as “zombies” ("Grillo: Partiti zombie", 2013) that will be blown 
away by historic advancements in technology.  
In opposing established institutions of all kinds, Grillo relies heavily on framing and 
articulating conspiracy theories. This is quite evident in posts found on his website.   In 
explaining economic problems, for example, Grillo argues that the meetings of the Bilderberg 
club – a private conference attended by people of influence from many countries of the world - 
determine the future of Italian and European policies ("L'informazione dimentica il bilderberg, il 
M5S no", 2013).  
He adds that the economic and political problems are also rooted in plotting that occurs 
between lobbyists of powerful and privileged interest groups, bankers and politicians. His 
conspiracy theories also extend into the realm of science and scientific explanations. In his 
shows, Grillo has also repeatedly supported positions that are contrary to mainstream science 
regarding vaccines and some diagnostic tests (like mammography) arguing that these are useless 
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or even harmful. In addition, he maintained that the HIV virus does not lead to AIDS, and 
supported a cure for cancer, firmly dismissed by scientists, devised some years ago by Dr. Luigi 
Di Bella (Arcovio, 2012).  
Some critics describe Grillo’s approach on such issues as scientific populism (Moatti, 
2013), some as denial of science, others as mere hoaxes. This popular epistemology, which is 
opposed to the complex explanation of scientists and experts, is a constitutive feature of the 
appeal of Beppe Grillo and of 5SM’s unofficial ideology (Mautino, 2012). The web, as pointed 
out by the World Economic forum , is the most common medium for the spread of conspiracy 
theories (Brewster, 2013; "Truth and lies: conspiracy theories are running rampant…", 2011), as 
each user can choose the explanation that appeals to him on every single issue. The 5SM takes 
advantage of it in order to gain political support. 
Grillo’s strategic approaches to politics and public policy are also rooted in a fundamental 
belief that he and the 5SM’s other principal actor, Casaleggio, share. A book published by 
Casaleggio is titled: “We are at War” ( Casaleggio & Grillo, 2011). Grillo often repeats this 
sentence in his public speeches, saying that the 5SM does not believe in the legitimacy of the 
present political institutions.  
This view explains why the comedian gave his support to some movements that 
vigorously contest the state and its actions, like the NO TAV movement
11
 in Piedmont or the 
                                                          
11
 The so called NO TAV is a movement that opposes a new railway line that will link Turin with Lyon, by a new 
tunnel under the Alps. Many inhabitants of the Italian Val di Susa (a Valley of Piedmont) began protesting in the 
nineties because they are worried that the new infrastructure would damage the environment of the Valley as well as 
the health of the population. In the following years the No TAV movement spread all over Italy and many more 
people and political activists joined it.     
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“Forconi” (Pitchforks) movement. During the “Forconi” protest12 in particular Grillo urged the 
policemen not to protect the politicians anymore and he asked them to join the protesters 
("Lettera aperta ai responsabili delle forze dell'ordine", 2013). When he talked to some activists 
of the far rightist movement “Casa Pound” (CasaPound Italia, 2013) he said he showed himself 
well-disposed towards them because they shared one important common goals with the 5SM: 
overthrowing the current political class. 
 
 3.4.2.2 European Integration Policy 
 The 5SM is also very careful in how it positions itself in relation to the European integration 
policy. Like some of its other policy positions, its position on European integration is ambiguous 
and vague. However, insofar as some coherent policy on European integration is detectable, it 
might best be described as Euro-skepticism.  
In many of his posts, Grillo expresses an anti-European attitude that is not based on 
identity-driven nationalism, but on economically driven nationalism. In recent years, the 5SM 
has strongly advocated a radical reform of EU institutions to ensure that better decisions are 
made that are sensitive to the needs of Italy and other southern European countries. In Grillo’s 
view, the EU pursued economic policies that favored Germany and northern European countries 
and penalized the states of the South.  In making his case, Grillo suggests that by allowing (and 
even fueling) the market’s pressure on Italian public bonds, Germany and France caused a huge 
capital outflow from Italy, thereby allowing companies from those countries to buy many Italian 
firms for little money ("L'Italia in mano agli usurai", 2014; "Il made in Italy che scompare", 
                                                          
12
 The so called “Movimento dei Forconi”, (Pitchfork) is a protest movement that arose at the end of 2013, 
organizing protests and road blocks in many Italian cities. The goal of the movement was to evict the government 
and go to new elections.  
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2013). He maintains that the austerity policies prescribed by the EU must be changed as soon as 
possible and the public debt of the member states must be communalized.  
Despite Grillo’s discourse that echoes some elements of the discourses of typical of far-
right leaders in Italy, his opposition to Europe and the Euro is less clear and strong than that of 
Italian right-wing parties. Indeed, while the so-called neopopulist parties champion an outright 
return to national currencies, the 5SM proposes referendums to decide whether to stay in the 
Eurozone or to abandon the common currency, and on other major changes in the EU’s economic 
policies, like the creation of Eurobonds or the dismissal of the so called “Fiscal Compact”13. 
Grillo does not divulge what option he would choose if a referendum were held. For now, it 
seems that he is trying to use the threat of a referendum to motivate Germany and other northern 
European countries to immediately change the economic policies of the EU.  
Grillo’s Euro-skepticism is partly the result of his electoral positioning beyond the 
traditional political ideologies and divisions. During the past year he has rebuffed efforts both by 
left and right wing parties inside and outside Italy to adopt particular positions on European 
integration. In the Italian political context Grillo has been invited and even taunted by Barbara 
Spinelli, a famous columnist for the major Italian newspaper La Repubblica and recently 
nominated as candidate for the left-leaning list Tsipras Italy, to consider future collaboration in 
the European Parliament in efforts to reduce the EU’s level of control on Italy.  
However, she was not optimistic that Grillo would respond positively to that appeal 
because in her estimation the 5SM is likely much less anti-European than it looks (“Lista Tsipras, 
Barbara Spinelli: possibile iniziare un rapporto con Grillo…”, 2014). Adopting an ambiguous 
                                                          
13
 The so called “Fiscal Compact”, formal name is “Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union”, is an agreement signed in 2012 by almost all the EU member states. With this 
agreement, the states that were highly indebted have committed to strengthen the measures to contain their deficit. 
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posture on that appeal, Grillo stated that he likes Alexis Tsipras, but he did not speak of 
agreements or future anti-European Union collaboration by the 5SM with any groups of the left. 
Similarly, during the electoral campaign for the 2014 European elections Grillo did not 
declare with which parliamentary group the 5SM’s MPs would be aligned within the European 
Parliament. The 5SM was courted by Marine Le Pen, the leader of French Front National, who 
asked all the Eurosceptic groups to form a common front to bring freedom and democracy to 
Europe: ''I ask all euro-skeptic parties in Europe to work together to defend nation states and to 
restore democracy, rule by the people and national identities ("France's National Front chief 
wants eurosceptic alliance", 2014).
  
Grillo, however, indicated that he does not want any alliance with the French Front 
National, because he believes it would make the 5SM appear as a right wing or even as a neo-
fascist movement to Italian voters ("Marine Le Pen tende la mano a Grillo, ma lui rifiuta…", 
2014). Among other right-wing leaders of anti-European parties, Grillo was also courted and 
praised by Nigel Farage from the British UKIP, who has become famous for calling for the exit - 
or at least for extreme autonomy – of Great Britain from the EU (Grillo: non lascio il tema 
immigrazione alla Lega….", 2014). Although Farage showed appreciation for the 5SM by 
praising its criticism and protests against European technocrats, Grillo has not agreed to any 
common future project with him, or anyone else, on this file. Clearly, Grillo was to be 
ambiguous, vague and free in dealing with European integration policy as it suits him and not 
any grand coalition either from the left or the right, or even a left/right coalition. 
  
3.4.2.3 Social and Environmental Policy   
In the case of social and environmental policy, a prevalent strategy used by the 5SM is to 
appropriate the high ground on what might be termed ‘good governance and public management’. 
In appropriating that ground it resorts to issuing general calls, rather than detailed proposals, for 
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better governance and public management in relation to every policy field. Notable examples of 
this include improving governance and public management in the pensions, health care and 
educational systems by, among other things, increasing and improving the level and quality of 
services and/or benefits provided, providing more transparency in public administration, and 
engaging citizens in deliberations and decisions by relying much more extensively on digital 
democracy.   
The 5SM’s policy platform contains some popular but very expensive social policy 
reform proposals that are almost impossible to realize, especially for a state whose finances are 
in dire straits. The first is a return to the preexisting pension system, which would allow workers 
to retire at 60 years of age, instead of at 67 after Monti's 2011 reform. The second is the 
introduction of a large, permanent and universal subsidy for the unemployed for as much as 
approximately 1,000 euro per person per month (Movimentocampania, 2013). 
Invariably, of course, the policy script of the 5SM, like that of other parties, in any given 
policy sector is designed to build its support among those who care about that particular policy 
issue. In the case of environmental policy, for example the 5SM has tried to appeal to those who 
care about the environment regardless of where they stand on the political spectrum in relation to 
other issues. Thus, in building support among those who might be considered by to be part of the 
environmental movement, the M5S has decided to embrace the theory of "de-growth" (Latuche, 
2004) which postulates that environmental sustainability depends on gradually reducing the 
dependence on economic growth and rising consumption of goods and services. The 5SM 
supports the green economy as a driving force for the creation of new jobs in many sectors of the 
economy. In doing so, it places an emphasis on the improvement of the process of garbage 
recycling, and expresses strong opposition to the building of incinerators and garbage dumps. 
The 5SM also opposes large infrastructural projects like the High Speed Railway in Piedmont 
(TAV) and in general it is against further urbanization of Italy. It proposes to adopt large-scale 
programs for energy efficiency, environmentally friendly transportation and to increase the 
production of renewable energy.  
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The way that the 5SM strategically positions itself both in relation to the aforementioned 
policy issues and also in relation to the machinations in the political arena is a reminder that the 
5SM is constantly thinking, like other political entities, about how to maximize support among 
some constituent groups. Grillo is very careful in taking a strong position on issues on which 
there is widespread consensus among the population, and not to take a strong position on issues 
that can be highly divisive. There are several notable divisive issues on which is position tends to 
be relatively vague, ambiguous and muted.   
One of these is the issue of tax evasion, which in Italy is traditionally very widespread. 
The necessity to approve measures to increase fiscal compliance is strongly supported by the 
progressive constituents while it is opposed by conservative ones. Another divisive issue is 
immigration: in Italy there are about 500,000 illegal immigrants ("Immigrazione regolare, 
clandestina e rifugiati", 2013) and in the past years the center-right coalition based its popular 
support on policies that were aimed at limiting the illegal inflow of foreign people. The same can 
be said for civil rights, especially for the debate on same sex marriage where Catholics and 
center-right constituents oppose any concessions. Grillo is aware that if he takes a stand on these 
themes he could lose his ability to attract a considerable part of voters, so he remains vague and 
concentrates on the most popular issues. 
 
3.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has provided a description of the main characteristics of the 5SM. The movement 
does not have a conventional institutionalized organizational structure. Instead, it has a relatively 
‘flat’ two level organizational structure with a singular leader at the top and the membership at 
the bottom. The link between and among them is a website that articulates policies, connects the 
5SM to actual and potential supporters, and coordinates the action of many local groups (or cells) 
linked virtually around the country. Grillo’s leadership is exercised in a relatively authoritarian 
manner and his charisma is fundamental for the movement’s cohesion.  Although 5SM’s ideology 
– or political philosophy - aims to establish a new form of ‘direct democracy’ where the citizen 
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no longer needs political representation, its political and policy platform consists of articulating 
strong positions on many issues on which there is a high degree of consensus and unity among 
the public, and relatively silent on politically divisive issues. Its platform is built mainly around 
the need for a renewal and moralization of the political system.  
This chapter described the main characteristics of the 5SM. The political analysis carried on in 
chapter 4 and 5 tries to define and classify the movements on the basis of the facts and features 
illustrated in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE 5SM 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to classify the 5SM as a political entity. The effort at classification 
revolves around the following interrelated questions: 
1. Is the 5SM a party, a movement, or a movement-party? 
2. Can the 5SM's mobilization be called populist? 
3. Is the 5SM's message left-wing, centrist or right-wing? 
4. To what extent the 5SM can be called extremist? 
      5.  Can some characteristics of the 5SM be defined as totalitarian? 
 
4.2 Is the 5SM a Party, a Movement or Movement-Party? 
 
Major scholars agree on two facts regarding the issue of the political definition of the 5SM. First, 
the movement is a party, no longer a movement, since it acts in the political arena, elects 
representatives in legislative assemblies and aims at exercising political power. Second, it is a 
“political animal” that is very difficult to define. Grillo and 5SM supporters maintain that the 
5SM is not a party, and they consistently try to prevent its complete institutionalization, defining 
their MPs as simple spokespersons that transmit the people’s will in Parliament.  
 The best definition of the 5SM is that provided by Herbert Kitschelt (2006) when he 
described the concept of the so-called “movement-parties”. Their characteristics are: they are a 
“coalitions of political activists who emanate from social movements and try to apply the 
organizational and strategic practices of social movements in the arena of party competition” 
(p.280); they have open membership; they have light organizational structure and no “physical 
infrastructure of communication"; they make low investment in the process of internal discussion 
on problem solving and social choice; there is an attempt at “combining activities within the 
arenas of formal democratic competition with extra-institutional mobilization” (p. 281). 
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 The 5SM can be considered a “movement-party”, but it does not have the very egalitarian 
and sometimes anarchical model of environmental parties. Indeed, it is located at the opposite 
extreme, where there are parties “led by a charismatic leader with a patrimonial staff and a 
personal following over which he exercised unconditional and unquestioned control” (Kitschelt, 
2006, p.280). In this thesis, so far, the 5SM has been referred to as a movement, according to its 
name and to his origins, but from this section on it will be called a movement-party to better 
reflect his hybrid political nature. 
 
4.3 Can the 5SM be defined as populist? 
 
The concept of populism has been used by many authors to define a large array of phenomena. 
Moreover, the term has been recently used by many political leaders to stigmatize their political 
antagonists. As Taguieff (2002) points out, the risk of using the term in a pejorative way is 
always present, therefore it is very important to clarify the meaning of the word and to specify 
the political context in which it is used. 
 The definition of populism as used in this chapter is the one given by Mény and Surel in 
their famous book “Democracies and the Populist Challenge” (2002). They describe populist 
mobilization as characterized by three distinct factors. First, the importance of “people” as “the 
center of their vision of the world and of the political institutions which organize the community” 
(p.12). 
This community is usually conceived as one single entity, homogeneous, composed just of the 
“true” people and excluding some enemy, some parts that do not really belong to it. The nature 
of the exclusion depends on the kind of populism, but it is always present: the tendency is “ to 
deny horizontal cleavages (such as the Left/Right divide) and to promote the fundamental unity 
of the people  while introducing a new vertical dimension, which may exclude, for instance, 
elites at the top and foreigners at the bottom” (Mény & Surel, 2002 p.12). 
 The second tenet of the populist message is that the people has been “betrayed” by those 
in power. Financial or political elites are the favorite targets in the populist narrative. They are 
blamed for the difficult conditions that the people are experiencing and for having pursued their 
own personal interests instead of the people’s general interest.  
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 The third element is the necessity to restore “the primacy of the people”. The goal is to 
oust politicians in national and international institutions and to implement forms of “pure” 
democracy like referenda or recall. Mény and Surel point out that this democratic ideal “is 
generally counteracted by the central position taken (or assumed) by the leader” who is the 
depositary of the authentic will and aspirations of the people. 
 The narrative of the 5SM exalts the people as the bearer of virtues and pits its interests 
against those of Italian and European elites of politicians, bankers and technocrats. Grillo can 
easily draw on the numerous scandals that have emerged in Italy in the past twenty years, where 
public expenses have constantly increased but services for the citizens declined. Corruption has 
spread at every level of public administration, and in every geographical zone of the country. 
Even many northern regions and municipalities that are historically richer and better 
administered, have been hit by inquiries into waste of public money, embezzlement and 
nepotism.  Many public corporations have been used to reward people that have supported and 
have been loyal to politicians and to political parties. 
 Grillo’s rhetoric explains that the 5SM is the instrument that will allow citizens to enter 
the institutions and thus to regain sovereignty over their nation. The 5SM attacks politicians, 
institutions and political parties with a great violence and vulgarity, totally denying their 
legitimacy. As other populist movements, the 5SM supports the adoption of mechanisms of 
direct democracy, like referenda and the “recall”; nevertheless the main goal it pursues is to 
overcome representative democracy to establish a real direct democracy through the use of the 
new web technologies.  Moreover, in spite of his emphasis on the right of citizens to decide 
without intermediaries and of his assumed position of simple “spokesperson” of the movement, 
Grillo’s authoritarian leadership is evident as he is still responsible for – or at least, strongly 
involved in - all the major political decisions of the movement. 
As we can see, the 5SM perfectly fits the flexible definition proposed by Meny and Surel. 
Grillo’s populism can be called “a pure” populism, as it does not have ideological connotations 
that position it on the right or on the left of the political spectrum. Its strength comes from the 
very particular situation Italy is experiencing: it is living a national moral and economic crisis in 
the midst of a broader European crisis. This probably explains why Grillo’s movement succeeds 
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in having major support by just pushing the anti-politics rhetoric to the extreme, without the need 
for scapegoats other than elites of politicians and technocrats. 
 
4.4 Is the 5SM a Left-Wing or a Right-Wing Populist Movement-Party? 
  
As shown in chapter 3, 5SM's platform is 'all over the map' ideologically on various issues. It is 
fair to say that the movement has a hybridized public philosophy which mixes slogans and 
proposals that come from diverse political traditions. For instance, like the leftist parties, it 
supports environmental protection, public education and public health care, while, similarly to 
the libertarian right, it champions a reduction of taxation. But the most important feature that 
characterizes the 5SM's platform is that it does not take a clear stand on politically contested 
issues. The reason for that consistent ambiguity is that the 5SM wants to be perceived as new, 
revolutionary, not linked to the political logics of the past in order to be able to attract voters 
with every political position. As a consequence, divisive issues are almost always neglected in 
Grillo's speeches. 
 From these elements, it is reasonable to draw the conclusion that the 5SM cannot be 
classified either as a right wing or as a left wing movement-party. Nevertheless, Grillo's populist 
message arose in a country where right-wing populist parties have attained great success in the 
last twenty years. As explained in chapter 5, Grillo’s rhetoric and his anti-establishment attitude 
are quite similar to those exhibited by recent Italian populist leaders, whose stance is identified 
with the political right. 
 The 5SM does not belong to the right side of the political spectrum, but it arose in 
contiguity with a conservative-commercial culture that became dominant in Italy in the last thirty 
years. As explained in chapter 2, the role of commercial television, which is functional to the rise 
of a neoliberal popular mindset, in  combination with atavistic elements in Italian culture and 
with a conservative push by the Vatican hierarchies, have determined the establishment of a 
conservative (low) cultural hegemony in the thought of the masses. The 5SM’s anti-state attitude 
and its aversion towards experts and the world of culture, derision of institutional demeanor, 
rejection of a politically-correct rhetoric and contempt towards politics and mediation in general 
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are elements that Grillo took on from the right-wing cultural milieu just to propose them again 
with a new political movement. 
 
4.4.1 Ambiguity towards fascism and immigration 
 The new right-wing cultural hegemony, directed by professionals appointed by the right-wing 
leaders, accomplished a rehabilitation of the Italian fascist past. History has been reframed and 
retold with the removal of some terrible misdeeds Italians had committed before and during the 
Second World War (Del Boca, 2010). Italy’s responsibilities in the Holocaust have been almost 
completely erased; the terrible war crimes committed in eastern Africa and in former Yugoslavia 
have almost been forgotten; the role of partisans who fought against the Nazi-fascist occupation 
during the war has been debunked or at least strongly deemphasized (Mammone, 2006).   
 Moreover, this new national popular narrative established a strong link between 
insecurity and immigration that resulted in widespread anti-immigrant attitudes. Studies show 
how media coverage in particular periods has created a sort of xenophobic psychosis that has 
been exploited for electoral purposes (Diamanti, 2008 b). Racist and xenophobic violence in 
Italy has increased in recent years as certified by several scholars (Andrisan, Naletto 2009 ; 
Associazione Lunaria, 2011, and the international observer, Human Right Watch, 2011). 
 
4.4.2. Grillo’s narrative as an expression of the dominant right-wing television culture 
Grillo's narrative is based upon this right-wing (low) culture in three specific ways. First, from 
the point of view of rhetoric, it is vulgar, aggressive and disrespectful of his opponents (in 
particular it is very similar to that of Bossi at the beginning of his political career). Second, 
Grillo expresses the same tolerance of tax evasion and opposition to state authority as does the 
Northern League and Berlusconi (Wu Ming, 2013).  The violent attacks on Equitalia, the main 
agency that collects taxes for the central and for local governments, perfectly epitomizes this 
anarchic and subversive attitude.  
 Third are his opinions about women, immigrants and fascism. For instance, Grillo called 
the five young women that the Democratic Party has proposed as top candidates of their electoral 
lists for the European elections as “veline”, which refers to scantily clad TV showgirls ("Grillo: 
capoliste Pd? 4 veline...", 2014). When the 5SM municipal councilor Federica Salsi participated 
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in a TV broadcast without Grillo’s permission, he declared that participating in talk show is like 
the “G spot” for many people ("Il talk show ti uccide, digli di smettere", 2012). Regarding 
immigrants, Grillo would use terms like “wild migrations” and “where can we put them?”, and 
“illegal immigrants should be put in jail” that are typical of xenophobic parties. He said that on 
Tunisian shores all women are like “Ruby” (the underage Moroccan girl who allegedly had sex 
with Berlusconi) and he blamed the Roma for committing crimes in Italy ("Beppe Grillo e 
l'immigrazione", 2013).  
 To a journalist asking him whether he is anti-fascist, Grillo answered that this is an issue 
he was not interested in and that if neo-fascists supporters wanted to join the 5SM they would be 
welcomed ("Grillo ai fascisti di Casapound, 2013). He also used the inscription on the gate of the 
concentration camp of Auschwitz to attack the Italian government, by changing “Arbeit macht 
frei” to “P2 macht frei” ("Se questo è un paese, 2014). Unfortunately, controversial and offensive 
declarations similar to Grillo’s, pronounced by 5SM’s MPs are many and have stirred up violent 
arguments and even law-suits. 
 There is another sense in which Grillo is linked to Italian television culture. As the 
scholar Giuliano Santoro (2012) maintains, Grillo's relation to his supporters is essentially the 
one a TV star has with his public: it is as though his TV show never ends and invades the field of 
politics. The selection mechanism of the 5SM’s MPs is similar to that applied in reality shows, 
that is, the spectator has the illusion of being able to decide who will win and lose a contest, and 
where the same spectator can even dream of becoming the star of the program. Moreover, even if 
the comedian describes the Internet as a separate medium that follows a different logic from the 
others (more democratic and horizontal), in fact he uses all media by imposing the top-down TV 
model of his shows. This is evident when reading the comments on his blog, where the majority 
of people use the same words as Grillo pronounces, the same nicknames and the same reasoning.  
 The TV communication model implies a deep asymmetric relationship, which Pasolini 
(1973) refers to as the intrinsic fascism of television, as it allows a few people to influence many 
others without giving the latter the possibility to reply or to respond in any effective way. 
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4.5 Is the 5SM a Moderate or Extremist Populist Movement-party? 
 
Anthony Painter (2013) in a recent paper on the rise of European populism devotes attention to 
whether the various populist movements are either moderate or extremist. In discussing 
extremism Painter pointed to two specific characteristics. The first characteristic is the way 
extremist movements exploit the democratic institutions. He suggests that extremists “take a 
more instrumental view of democracy: it either serves their purpose or it does not…. Therefore, 
they enter democratic space and depart from it at intervals depending on the degree to which it 
serves their purpose” (Painter, 2013 p. 25).  
 Given that conceptualization of extremism, some analysts have suggested that the 5SM 
has some extremist characteristics. As explained in Chapter 2, the 5SM uses its presence in 
Parliament to attain a double aim: to hinder any possible reforms of the system with the 
justification that compromise is the absolute evil, and to gain visibility in the media through 
blatant protests. Moreover, while Grillo clearly states that the 5SM’s main goal is to undermine 
representative institutions and to overthrow the current system, every time that the government 
acts by decree (without consulting Parliament), the 5SM ferociously complains about an alleged 
“demise of Italian democracy” or a “coup d’etat”. The respect of democratic procedures is 
invoked only when they advance the movement’s interests, not as a value in themselves.           
 The second characteristic of extremism identified by Painter is a tolerance or even 
acceptance of violent actions. The evidence presented in Chapter 3 suggests that this 
characteristic has been evident in the 5SM. In addition to the frequent use of insults and verbal 
violence, there is support for every movement that resorts to illegal and even violent protest. The 
epitome of this attitude is the open support for the sometimes violent No-Tav protest in 
Piedmont, the unauthorized road blocks of the group “Forconi” and the movement for the 
independence of Veneto from Italy that threatens not to pay taxes to Italy anymore. But the more 
clamorous case has been the public urging to policemen and public servants to stop obeying 
orders and join the rebels.       
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 Florian Hartleb (2012) enumerates the features of extremism explicitly, including both  
right-wing and left-wing extremism as well as fundamentalism. These are: “dogmatism; use of 
conspiracy theories; anti-constitutionalism; the use of stereotypes; economic anti-liberalism; and 
utopianism” (p. 49).  From the report provided above, it is evident that the 5SM, in many 
respects, incarnates these features. The reason it is not considered as an extremist movement by 
many commentators on mainstream media is that they consider Grillo’s statements just as a 
comedian’s provocations that are not to be taken too seriously. Other experts (Santoro, 2013; 
Scalfari, 2007; Wu Ming, 2013; Merlo, 2013), though, maintain that the friends-versus-enemies 
psychology of many activists and their non-critical acceptance of the movement’s doctrine are 
already similar to that of activists of parties that ended up being dangerous for democracy. 
 Indeed, unlike right-wing neo-populist movements (like the Northern League, the French 
Front National and the British UKIP) the 5SM does not dream of going back to the past with the 
certainties of old ethnically homogeneous communities (Aime, 2012). Instead, it is focused on 
the future, towards a world dominated by green technologies and perfect democracy. This is not 
unlike some of the fascists of the last century who were thrilled in thinking about the future and 
perceived themselves as something new and not linked to values of tradition and conservation. 
Moreover, their members were not aware of what they were helping to create and what the real 
aim of their violence was. This is the reason that the famous journalist, Corrado Augias, called 
some 5SM supporters and MPs “unaware fascists” (Maurihal100 , 2014).  
 The mix of naivety and ignorance which mark these people’s attitudes and actions are a 
threat to liberal democracy. Equally dangerous is the “millenarian” conception of truth explained 
above that accounts for the paranoia of being surrounded by enemies, which is quite prevalent 
within totalitarian regimes. This paranoid attitude, in turn, determines a psychology of suspicion 
that views every criticism as a betrayal and every free thinker as a saboteur. This explains the 
numerous cases of expulsion of members that occurred both in the 5SM and in various 
totalitarian movements of the past. 
 Finally, there is one other important element described by Arendt (1973) that is typical of 
authoritarian leaders in the phase of pursuing power that applies to the 5SM: this is the 
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opportunistic ways in which they position their movements. The opportunistic behavior of the 
leader is allowed by the vagueness of its platform that gives him the ability to act tactically with 
little risk of contradiction of previous stances. In the case of the 5SM, the program just avoids 
divisive issues and this gives Grillo the ability to refuse compromise with other parties by 
constantly changing his positions on these issues (Laudonio & Panarari, 2014). He can always 
find a reason not to agree on some particular point and thus maintain his ambiguous and 
advantageous political location of being neither right nor left. At the same time, by refusing to 
cooperate, he renders political compromise on divisive issues more difficult to attain by the other 
parties.    
 
4.6 Is the 5SM a totalitarian movement-party? 
 
The final question in classifying the 5SM is whether it is a democratic, authoritarian or 
totalitarian movement-party. As noted in previous sections of this thesis, the 5SM likes to depict 
itself a democratic movement, but its discourse and actions are not very consistent with that 
depiction. The 5SM is not a highly democratic or egalitarian movement-party. Unlike some other 
movement-parties it does not have the very democratic or egalitarian organizational model that 
in its most extreme forms begins to look like an anarchical organizational model with little, if 
any, concentration of power in either one or a few individuals. 5SM's discourse and actions 
both in relation to internal party governance and governance within the Italian polity in general 
manifest or exhibit what arguably might be described as authoritarian and possibly even 
totalitarian themes and tones (Rondolino, 2014; Santoro, 2013; Flores D’arcais 2012).  
 It must be noted here that to suggest that the 5SM manifests or exhibits such themes and 
tones is not to conclude that it is authoritarian or totalitarian. What the thesis wants to argue, 
instead, is that these dangerous elements should be considered together with other elements that 
are more compatible with a liberal democratic regime: the totalitarian features constitute a 
possible development path that the movement can take or refuse depending on which of its 
tendencies will emerge and prevail on others. In pointing to those characteristics the chapter 
focuses on the positions and messages articulated by the leadership and membership of the 5SM. 
63 
 
There are at least four such characteristics that are often associated with authoritarian and 
totalitarian regimes.  
 
 
4.6.1. Characteristic #1: Claiming that the Movement’s Doctrine is Supported by Science 
The first of these characteristics is the creation of the illusion that the doctrine of the movement 
is supported by science. When science does not seem to support the movement’s core beliefs the 
leaders resort either to criticizing science or creating and invoking a pseudo-science that 
produces falsehoods and utopias (Mautino, 2012; Moatti, 2013). In effect, they are trying to 
create some kind of “revealed truth” which gives the political leaders a semblance of infallibility.  
 This tendency is evident when Grillo maintains that “ordinary” or “mainstream science” is 
often corrupt and directed by big economic interests. In place of science he then invokes false 
assertions, which resonate with 5SM members who are very resistant to all refutations of 
assertions in the movement’s dogma by experts and scientists. Indeed, efforts at refuting the 
assertions of the leadership are depicted as conspiratorial attempts by those who aim to discredit, 
derail and defeat it.  
 Like totalitarian leaders described by Arendt (1973), Grillo proffers prophecies and 
predictions that do not need to come true, as they are part of an action of liberation based on a 
deeper truth, which sooner or later will be made manifest. Indeed, Grillo talks about other parties 
or about old media (newspaper and TV) as if they were walking dead that will be swept away by 
history (Natale & Ballatore 2014); and even if this were not to happen, nobody in the 5SM seems 
to notice the falsehood of these prophecies. So Grillo can still launch prophecies and at the same 
time work to realize them without ever facing the scrutiny of reason because he is the bearer of a 
deeper knowledge that goes beyond “ordinary” reason.  
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4.6.2 Characteristic#2: Overthrow of Existing Political Institutions 
A second major characteristic of authoritarian mindset is a fixation on the need for overthrowing 
the existing regime and existing institution by any means, not explicitly excluding violent means. 
The promise is that great freedom and effectiveness can be achieved through a new political 
order in which all citizens will have either equal say or at least equal treatment, and possibly 
even both. Such a mindset was revealed in a recent interview by Casaleggio, the 5SM’s 
ideologue, who explained the goals and strategies of the movement as follows:  
In the coming months, in Italy, there will be unrest and riots that the police cannot 
control. The parties, by now, are archaic structures: the future is direct democracy 
through the Web… They will be replaced. The word 'digital democracy' is a more 
encompassing word than the concept of direct democracy. And it is direct democracy that 
is emerging... It has already brought to the fore many instances of people that had not 
participated in political life. (“Casaleggio: nei prossimi mesi shock economico, rivolte e 
disordini”, 2013) 
 
Direct democracy, in Casaleggio’s words, means: "to carry, to transfer to the citizens the weight 
of decisions, participation, and then replace the existing proxy, which is a blank proxy…” it also 
means "the eruption of the citizen in political life, the citizen becomes a politician in the first 
person.”   
 The 5SM aims to abolish representative democracy to create an authentic govern of the 
people. The founders of the movement believe that this will be a global process that is spurred by 
improvements in internet and other communications technology that will foster a more 
egalitarian society. To attain this objective, there is, first, a need for a popular rebellion that 
would blast away old political structures. Recently, as is mentioned above, the 5SM has 
supported all the movements threatening the state’s authority and challenging the established 
order. Moreover, as Casaleggio explained, the 5SM refuses to cooperate with any political party 
that attempts to improve the economic and social situation by reforming the system. Indeed, 
when a journalist asked the ideologue what he would do if the 5SM entered in a government with 
the center-left parties, Casaleggio replied he would quit the movement (“Casaleggio: nei prossimi 
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mesi shock economico, rivolte e disordini”, 2013). As it is evident also from the activities of 
5SM MPs, they almost always refuse to agree with the other parties on any reform and they 
tactically defend positions and provisions that are popular but impossible for the government to 
adopt. 
 
4.6.3 Characteristic #3: Acceptance of Violence to Change the System  
A third characteristic of an authoritarian or totalitarian mindset is its acceptance of violence to 
overthrow and to control political and economic systems. Although the 5SM is not explicitly 
calling for violent actions as a means to produce change, it is not entirely opposed to the use of 
violence to varying degrees. The notable difference between the 5SM and some radical and 
violent movements like Golden Dawn, the Greek neo-Nazi party, is that the 5SM’s supporters do 
not use physical violence against any particular group. Instead, they engage in what might be 
termed ‘oratorical violence’.  
 Grillo’s speeches are full of violent verbal attacks and insults directed at political enemies 
and even leading politicians and statesmen, like the President of the Italian Republic or the 
German Chancellor (Mackenzie, 2014). Many 5SM supporters express themselves on the web 
with some of the same words and with some themes and tones that are even more offensive and 
hateful than those of Grillo (Parboni, 2014).  In some cases their views have stirred up very 
strong reactions and even led to lawsuits against them. 
 Another way that Grillo encourages verbal violence against individuals on his website is 
by posting the names of journalists or politicians who have criticized or opposed the 5SM. He 
does this in order to allow supporters to attack them in their posts, and this often results in insults 
and obscenities. Many of the people who write on the blog do not act like political activists but 
like irrational supporters (hooligans) of a football team during a match in a stadium (Ruffini, 
2014). In this way, insults and rage are a new kind of political language as the room for 
ideological debate and exchange of ideas within the movement is no longer available.  
 Some analysts suggest that the 5SM gives voice to people who can no longer express 
themselves because of economic and social distress, the same way fascism and Nazism did with 
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soldiers who returned from the horrors of war or were unemployed in the 1930s (Benjamin, 
2011; Santoro 2013). So, like the voices of desperate and disoriented people almost a century 
ago who expressed rage and violence, many of Grillo’s followers show that the blog gives them 
the venue to express these same feelings against an enemy that is hindering the movement and its 
efforts to liberate people. 
 In defending the aggressive oratorical violence that he and his followers engage in, Grillo 
has stated several times that if the 5SM did not exist in Italy there would be dangerous 
subversive parties like Golden Dawn that would express popular outrage in a very physically 
violent way (“Grillo: senza il M5S qui sarebbero arrivati gli estremisti…”, 2012). One of the 
premises of this statement is that under certain economic conditions people always (or naturally) 
act in a violent and irrational way like totalitarian movements did in the past against institutions, 
politicians and minorities. This premise is wrong as is evident in the case of Spain and Portugal 
where the effects of the economic crisis were more severe than in Italy, but where there are no 
movements such as 5SM or Golden Dawn. Moreover, the tragic conditions of Greece are not 
comparable with those of Italy since the Italian economy still has a dynamism that the Greek 
economic system does not have, and Italian people are on average considerably better off than 
the Greeks.  
 At any rate, following the premise of Grillo’s statement, the 5SM expresses public rage, 
and by doing so it is saving the country and the people from the adverse effects of physical 
violence. In short, Grillo justifies what he and his supporters do as relatively harmless expression 
of popular rage that serves as an important warning for the establishment to start governing and 
conducting politics differently. 
   
4.6.4 Characteristics #4: Encouraging People to feel like a mass 
A fourth characteristic of the authoritarian and totalitarian mindset that is evident in the 5SM is 
the tendency to encourage people to reject liberalism and pluralism in favour of 
communitarianism and monism. People should abandon their individual and group interests and 
embrace the national interests. As Hannah Arendt (1968) explained, fascism and Nazism arose in 
a context where the class system had been destroyed by war and the ensuing economic 
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depression, so that people felt they were no longer part of any distinct associations, political 
groups or social groups.  
 Citizens had become a mass, where individuals felt isolated and unable to express their 
distress through traditional means. Such feelings of isolation have been augmented by the 
progressive weakening of unions, political parties and business associations: these are 
intermediary bodies that structure society by dividing the masses according to the diverse 
interests of each group. These structures allow citizens to establishing horizontal ties and 
relationship between individuals. In this way they empower citizens and workers by giving them 
a precise identity and a sense of dignity by being be part of a particular distinct category within 
society.   
 The existence of unions, parties and diverse associations renders the individuals richer 
and stronger,   preventing the emergence of the sense of solitude and anonymity which, instead, 
arises when the individuals feel just part of an undistinguished mass. This is the reason why 
totalitarian leaders do not want class divisions and conflicting interests within society; indeed 
they need a shapeless mass that can develop a strong affective link with its leader. 
  As discussed in chapter two, Grillo and Casaleggio have tried to capitalize on this type of 
context in Italy in recent years. The recent economic crisis brought millions of Italians to the 
brink of poverty (Ricciardi, 2013). Millions of temporary workers, who are exploited and paid 
very little, do not feel represented by unions and political parties. The long-term unemployed 
have lost confidence in the political system. In other words, the Italian social system is in 
jeopardy, and many people have lost their status, economic security and their confidence in the 
future (Iannello, 2013). 
 Grillo and the 5SM have tried to exploit this situation and add fuel to the fire of people’s 
discontent by trying to frighten those who still have a secure income and faith in the current 
system, in the existing political parties and unions. Also by opposing every possible solution and 
criticizing every action the government takes to improve the situation, the 5SM cynically pursues 
its political interests. So, it is evident the 5SM attempts to facilitate the deterioration of political 
and social conditions to be able to seize power by exploiting popular discontent. In addition, the 
will to undermine the existing political institutions to be able to exercise power over a mass of 
people that will no longer be divided by distinct interests is also clear. Santoro (2013) maintains 
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that: “the aspiration, often repeated, of the 5SM’s supporters is to represent all the Italian 
people… there is no partiality, and there are no class differences and conflicts… The people is 
the homogeneous and peaceful mass.” 
   
4.7 Summary 
 
This chapter has explained that the 5SM can be defined as a movement-party as described by 
Kitschel (2006).  The chapter has also established that the 5SM exhibits the characteristics of 
populist mobilization as described by Meny and Surel (2002). It also revealed that 5SM's 
populism espouses a hybrid ideological framework articulated in its narrative consisting of 
political and economic values that span the political spectrum from the left to the right. In the 
5SM narrative and behaviour there are elements that are typical of extremist movements, in 
particular its strategy which aims at destabilizing existing democratic institutions. 
  Finally, the chapters described a set of similarities between some characteristics of the 
5SM and those of totalitarian parties of the past. In particular, Grillo's movement-party seems to 
be encapsulated in a collective psychology that perceive as a dangerous enemy every entity 
(institutions, thinkers, scientists and organizations) which criticizes its strategy and beliefs . 
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CHAPTER 5: COMPARISON OF THE 5SM TO OTHER ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT 
MOVEMENTS AND PARTIES 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter compares the 5SM to other populist movements and parties in Italy, a few selected 
European countries, and two international movements.  In Italy the focus is on recent populist 
parties like Forza Italia, Partito della Liberta, the Northern League and the Italy of Values. In the 
selected European countries the focus is on the groups of neopopulist parties of the new-left, the 
new radical left (exemplified by SYRIZA in Greece) and the Pirate parties in Sweden and 
Germany. The comparison with international social movements is to “Occupy Wall Street” and 
the “Indignados”. The focus of the comparison between the 5SM and all these movements is on 
the following: their organizational structure, their leadership style, their constituency (i.e., 
members and supporters), their ideology, and their policy platform.   
 The goal of the comparison to Italian populist parties is to verify whether the 5SM is 
explainable as an evolution of Italian populism and, if so, whether it comes from a rightist or a 
leftist political tradition. The goal of the comparison to International anti-establishment parties 
and movements is to examine whether Grillo's movement party fits in any of the category 
established by the literature. The comparison also helps analyze more depth the characteristics of 
the 5SM. 
 
5.2 Comparison with Italian populist parties 
 
This section compares the 5SM to other Italian populist parties. Toward that end it provides an 
overview of the genesis, key characteristics, and platforms, and leadership of major populist 
parties in Italy.  
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After the Second World War, Italian politics was dominated by two large rival parties: 
Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democracy) (DC), and the Italian Communist Party (PCI). The 
government was supported by coalitions centered around the DC and several smaller parties. The 
PCI was for many years the biggest communist party in the western world and it has always 
stayed in opposition.  After the fall of the USSR and the Eastern European regimes, the PCI 
changed its name (it became PDS, Democratic Party of the Left) and experienced a mutation: it 
became more moderate, following the European social democratic model, so the more orthodox 
communists founded a new leftist party called "rifondazione comunista" (communist 
refounding).  
In the period from 1992 to 1994 many scandals, involving corrupt relationships between 
the political parties that formed the government and the main corporations and industries of the 
country, emerged. There was a major judicial inquiry, "Tangentopoli" (from tangente, kick-back) 
that substantially destroyed the DC’s reputation and that of parties aligned with it (Waters, 1994). 
Public prosecutor Antonio Di Pietro, who investigated and grilled many entrepreneurs and 
politicians, shot to fame as the trials against corrupt elites were broadcasted on TV.  
During this critical period, the electoral system was overhauled and became first-past-the-
post, although it conserved a small proportional quota. Italy looked ready for a modern two party 
democracy where two major blocs could alternate in governing the country. New political parties 
emerged and other traditionally minor parties grew significantly, gaining unexpected popular 
support. The neofascist party, Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance), the regionalist and 
separatist northern Italian movement, Lega Nord (Northern League) and the new Berlusconi 
libertarian party, Forza Italia (Forward Italy), formed a center-right alliance. Later, in 1996, the 
prosecutor Antonio di Pietro entered politics, joining the former communists (then PDS), and in 
1998 founded his own anti-corruption party, the Italia dei Valori (Italy of Values), joining the 
center-left coalition. 
During the Second Republic, the bipolar political pattern increasingly affected voters’ 
behavior (Massari, 2004) with the centrist parties, which did not want to coalesce with either of 
the blocs, progressively losing voters and political importance. The political scene has been 
dominated by a struggle between a populist center-right front and an internally divided center-
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left coalition (D’Alimonte & De Sio., 2012). This bipolar pattern stayed in effect from the 1994 
national election until the most recent election in 2013, when the 5SM suddenly burst onto the 
political scene. The nature and the political trajectory of the populist parties of the Italian Second 
Republic will be analyzed in the following paragraphs, to underline trends that can partly explain 
5SM’s populism. 
 
5.2.1 Forza Italia and the Popolo della Libertà  
As explained in chapter two, Silvio Berlusconi is an entrepreneur who made his first fortune in 
the construction business in the seventies;  Then he moved into the media industry and due to his 
good connections with the parties that governed during the First Republic, he gradually built a 
financial and media empire. Berlusconi decided to enter politics in 1993 after the parties of the 
anti-communist bloc had disappeared and when the courts began inquiries into the management 
of his corporations and his relations with politicians. In a few months he organized Forza Italia, 
his political party. Largely due to his massive economic resources and his huge propaganda 
machine his party gained more than 20% of votes in the 1994 national election. 
Forza Italia’s platform was based on two antinomies: anti-politics and anti-communism 
(Bardi, 1996). Berlusconi created and projected an image as a self-made man and rich 
entrepreneur who provided jobs for many people, and who was opposed the parasitic 
professional politicians of the left. Second, he championed neoliberal reforms that opposed the 
big welfare program and high taxation scheme of the left parties. Berlusconi represented small 
business and self-employed professionals who felt vexed by high taxes and a smothering 
bureaucracy. 
As we have seen above, after many years and three Berlusconi administrations, the 
situation of the country did not improve as taxes actually increased and social programs, 
although still in place, were significantly reduced (Ascoli & Pavolini, 2012). In recent years it 
became clear that Berlusconi’s main goals have been to protect his economic interests from 
market competition in the TV sector and to evade criminal prosecution. To achieve these goals, 
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he needed popular approval, which he pursued by every available means such as distributing 
favors, promising unrealistic tax breaks to many people and publicly justifying tax evasion, as 
well as nominating candidates facing criminal charges and/or with convictions as long as they 
could bring votes (Cottone, 2008). 
In order to better protect his personal interests, in 2008 Berlsuconi also decided to merge 
with the neo-fascist party - called National Alliance - so that he could be the master of the 
biggest Italian party. The paradox resulting from this merger is that Gianfranco Fini, leader of 
the former fascists, became more moderate and respectful of the institutions than Berlusconi. 
Moreover, because he demanded more internal pluralism, Fini was eventually chased out of the 
party. (Redazione Contenuti Digitali, 2010). Recently, many former fascist politicians ended up 
supporting Berlusconi and becoming the fiercest watchdogs of his power and authority 
(Ceccarelli, 2009). 
Berlusconi’s party evolved over time. Initially it was markedly libertarian, more moderate 
than the neo-fascists (Pirani, 2010), and expressed anti-establishment sentiments. After 20 years, 
however, he has transformed his party in a very conservative coalition where former fascists, 
former Christian Democrats and former socialists are kept together by Berlusconi’s charisma and 
his huge fortune. To summarize, his party shifted from being a charismatic protest party of the 
center-right to personal “patrimonial” party of the far right. This political shift to the right has 
been noted by many representatives of the more centrist and progressive European People’s 
Party, who considered expelling Berlusconi’s party from their parliamentary group. 
  
5.2.2 The Northern League 
Founded by Umberto Bossi in the early 1980s, Lega Nord (LN) or Northern League elected its 
first two representatives in the Italian Parliament in 1987. The party’s principal political goals are 
to achieve greater authority and autonomy to northern regions (the richest in the country), and 
the elimination of existing political parties that governed Italy corruptly and inefficiently for 
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many years. The support of the LN for more autonomy oscillated between a roughly-conceived 
federalism and secession from Italy. Indeed, the LN invented the “Padania” (Oneto, 1997), a land 
that extends all through northern Italy and whose inhabitants had a different ethnic origin from 
the rest of Italians. Of course, this alleged heartland has a different history from what the LN 
supporters alleged, but this distortion of history was useful to create a nationalistic passion 
among the diverse northern Italian peoples.   
In its fight for autonomy for those regions, the LN demonstrated some xenophobic bias 
and promulgated stereotypes against southern Italians, charging them as idle and exploiters of 
social programs. Its xenophobia also extended to immigrants. This was amply evident starting in 
the 1990s when, as immigration to Italy increased, immigrants became the favorite polemic 
target for the LN. Xenophobic tones became more aggressive and the party concentrated on the 
defense of local tradition from the foreigners’ “invasion”. In particular, the LN, like other 
European populist movements, focused its anger against immigrants coming from Islamic 
countries (Avanza, 2010).    
Nevertheless, until the end of the First Republic, the main focus of Bossi’s flamboyant 
and aggressive rhetoric were the politicians, who were blamed for wasting taxpayers’ money, 
nepotism and blatant pursuit of personal interests. The LN conveyed the rebellion of the small 
entrepreneurs of the North, who wanted fewer and lower taxes, a more efficient state and less 
bureaucracy. This protest party strongly supported the inquests led by the public prosecutor’s 
office based in Milan, known also as “Mani Pulite” (clean hands) team, against corrupt 
politicians, which accelerated the fall of the parties that had governed throughout the First 
Republic (Biorcio, 2012). 
In the 1994 national elections, the LN aligned itself with Berlusconi’s party, but the two 
parties parted ways by the end of the year. After several years of intense conflict, the two 
populist parties formed a new alliance in 2001 (which is still in place) that has allowed the 
parties to govern the country for more than nine years (from 1994 to 1995, from 2001 to 2006 
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and from 2008 to 2011). Umberto Bossi's charismatic leadership lasted until scandals for 
mismanagement of the party's funds blemished him. Bossi exercised his power in an absolutist 
way, expelling numerous party members who contested the party’s official positions (Passarelli, 
2013). 
During the last Berlusconi government from 2008-2011, Roberto Maroni, an LN member 
and minister of the interior, initiated several restrictive policies designed to limit immigration 
and to penalize immigrants who were already in Italy. These measures have been harshly 
criticized by many international observers and some of them have been condemned by the 
European Court Human Rights as well as by the Italian constitutional court. The most shocking 
of Maroni’s proposals was to keep a file on the nomadic peoples living in Italy, by fingerprintint 
Roma gipsy children in order to clamp down on street begging (Colombo, 2012; Milani, 2013). 
Like the Forza Italia, over time the LN shifted towards the right (Ignazi, 2005). At the 
same time it became indifferent to the needs of the country, because it was primarily focused on 
exploiting the popular discontent to gain electoral support. Indeed, while in 1995-1996 during a 
difficult political crisis, Bossi’s party agreed to participate in a government with the left and the 
centrists. During the 2011 crisis, when Italy risked a disastrous economic default, it refused to 
cooperate with other parties to support action to secure the country’s finances.   
In recent years the LN has sided with the French Front National and proposes a European 
action to limit immigration as well as a return to the national currencies by the European states 
(Mudde, 2014). Its original anti-politics attitude faded as the movement completed its 
"institutionalization", and xenophobic motives took front and center in its platform, and their 
expression became increasingly manifest and vulgar (Dematteo, 2011). 
  
5.2.3 Italia Dei Valori 
After examining the two major Italian populist movement parties, the focus shifts now on the 
history of a left-wing anti-establishment populist movement parties (Andrews, 2009) founded by 
a former magistrate, Antonio di Pietro, who left his judicial career in 1996 and decided to enter 
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politics by joining the former communist party (PDS). In 1998 he founded his own party, the 
Italia dei Valori or Italy of Values (IDV), and in the following years he positioned the party 
either within the center-left coalition or very close to that alliance. 
The platform of the IDV was focused on the need for more transparency in public 
administration and the need to fight against corruption at every political level. Traditionally, the 
value of "legalità" (observance of the law) is a right-wing value, while the so-called "garantismo" 
(i.e. the protection of civil liberties for people accused of crimes but not yet sentenced) is a leftist 
value. In Italy during the last twenty years after Berlusconi entered politics, the right defended a 
double, or even triple standard of justice: harsh with the poor and foreigners, indulgent of public 
administrators and the rich, and easy on tax evaders. Therefore, “law and order” populism in Italy 
is politically located on the left.   For many years Antonio di Pietro was Silvio Berlusconi's 
nemesis, accusing him of being a criminal in a very direct and confrontational way 
(Presidentemalefico, 2010). 
The IDV experienced a crisis during the 2011-2012 inquiries into the management of the 
party’s regional funds, as one of its regional councilor was accused of embezzlement (Sarzanini 
et al., 2012). Afterwards, in a TV broadcast (Giannini, 2012), Di Pietro's management of the 
party's funds and assets was examined, casting doubts on his personal honesty. This tarnished the 
party, especially because just at that time, Beppe Grillo's 5SM was on the rise and attracting 
voters who were disappointed with the existing parties. Di Pietro tried to arrange a common 
action with Grillo against corruption, but the comedian, although not disparaging Di Pietro as did 
the other politicians, refused, preferring to fight his battles against "the caste" alone. The IDV, 
then, tried to align with a movement founded by another former anti-mafia magistrate, Antonio 
Ingroia, but in the 2013 election they could not attract enough votes to enter Parliament. 
Although Di Pietro was a charismatic leader, he never attracted more than five or six percent of 
votes. His populist tones and his over-simplified message probably alienated many highly 
educated center-left voters. At the same time, his lack of extremism did not allow him to attract 
the votes of people who felt outraged by the ongoing economic deterioration of the country and 
misconduct of many politicians. 
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 5.2.4 Conclusions of the comparison between the 5SM and recent Italian populist parties 
The trajectory of both Berlusconi’s parties and the LN is similar: they began as anti-
establishment and libertarian parties and ended up positioning themselves at the extreme right of 
the political spectrum.  They are still successful parties despite the numerous scandals involving 
their leaders. Instead, the IDV, which aimed to attract moderate and progressive voters to fight 
against corruption but without attacking the country’s democratic institutions, seems headed 
toward political death. What is relevant in this development is the electoral behavior of 
“moderate” voters.  In voting they seem to gravitate primarily towards the conservative parties 
rather than progressive or socialist parties. A 2008 study conducted by the political scholar Ilvo 
Diamanti (2008) compared the results of the 2008 elections with the 1948 polls, the first 
elections in the postwar period. The results were surprisingly similar in term of support for 
conservative parties as opposed to socialist parties. The study revealed that in 2008 the 
Berlusconi - Bossi coalition gained roughly the same percentage of votes as the DC and it was 
strong in the same areas where the Christian Democrats were dominant in 1948. Similarly, the 
left achieved almost the same results it obtained 60 years earlier.        
This suggests that the traditional cleavages between conservatives and progressives have 
remained the same. The notable difference between 1948 and 2008 was in the kind of messages 
and types of leaders the conservative constituents supported. The DC was not a personalized 
party and had a strong sense of democratic institutions. Moreover, it had deep Catholic roots that 
espoused values like solidarity and protection for ethnic and cultural minorities. Bossi’s and 
Berlusconi’s parties defended the Church’s positions on ethical issues such as in vitro fertilization 
or euthanasia but, at the same time they championed individualism and xenophobia and 
neglected social marginalization all of which contradict the Christian spirit (Sigona, 2010).     
The Italian center-right experienced the same mutation that affected American 
conservatism from the eighties on and more strongly with the rise of the Tea Party movement. 
The more popular positions within the center-right became more extreme. Increasingly Christian 
religion has been interpreted in an identity-making way (Garau, 2010) in distinguishing 
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Christians from members of other faiths, and the rhetoric against their political opponents 
became more abrasive and polemic. (Bianchi, 2009) In this way, moderate Italian conservatives 
apparently disappeared. Indeed, in the 2013 national elections after Berlusconi and the LN had 
brought the country to the verge of collapse, moderate voters did not abandon them, and Monti’s 
centrist coalition obtained just 10.5% of votes.   
Grillo and the 5SM arose after two decades in which public opinion had been dominated 
by the right-wing populist parties that brought about a sharp deterioration of the political 
language. Indeed, more than 50% of Italian voters in 2008 had voted for parties or movements 
that could be classified as populist, and the nadir of the economic crisis was yet to come. 
Although the recent recession may have expanded the number of leftist voters attracted by 
populist campaigns, the largest room for the expansion of populist parties has been on the right. 
The characteristics that Grillo has had in common with Berlusconi and Bossi are 
leadership style vis-à-vis members of the party; the violent rhetoric against political competitors 
and political institutions; the charisma needed for exciting crowds with a mix of fanatic and 
buffoonish attitudes (Bordignon and al. 2013); the lack of tolerance for internal opposition; the 
consideration of the movement as a personal fiefdom; and the polemic against the symbols, 
dynamics and rules of liberal democracy. (Santoro 2012)  Given these similarities among the 
leaders and their key policy positions, the 5SM is likely to have much room for future growth 
among right-wing voters. This is especially true as Berlusconi becomes less appealing to his 
supporters due to his political management style that reflects a strong sense of entitlement, his 
legal problems, and his age. 
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5.3 Comparison to European Anti-establishment Parties and Movements 
 
This section compares the 5SM to several groups of populist parties. This includes the neo-
populist right-wing parties, new left parties, and international social movements.  
 
5.3.1 Comparison to the Neo-populist Right-wing Parties 
Paul Taggart, in a 1995 article, describes a new class of political parties that he calls 
“neopopulist”. Drawing on contributions by scholars like Pietro Ignazi (1992) and Hans George 
Betz (1993), he characterizes this new form of populism as:  
(1) An expression of the radical right alternative to neo-fascist parties;  
(2) Opposition “to the system and to those who run the system” (Taggart, 1995, p.39);  
(3) Linked to the idea of “heartland” of a national or regional homogeneous community, 
and thus attacking immigrants and minorities;  
(4) Linked to the idea of “ordinary man”, thus attacking “politicians, bureaucrats and 
intellectuals;”   
(5) Neo-liberal and individualistic from an economic point of view, and thus opposing 
taxation, expensive public programs and attacking welfare recipients;  
(6) Cultivating an “electoral base that crosses from the left to the right, but with a 
prevalence of male voters (p. 39); and  
(7) Based on a charismatic leadership and strong central power, thus opposing the 
traditional model of “professional-bureaucratic parties”. 
 
The main European parties that, at present, best incorporate many elements of this model 
are the Italian Northern League, Marine Le Pen’s Front National in France, Belgium’s ethnic-
separatist Flemish Interest, the Netherlands’ Party for Freedom, the Freedom Party of Austria 
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and Nigel Farage’s United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). These parties have in common 
strong opposition to the European Union, and their rhetoric involves bringing monetary and 
political sovereignty back to the nation states (Mudde, 2014). 
The 5SM has several characteristics that differentiate it from this group of parties. First, 
the 5SM opposes the neoliberal ideology and supports an enlargement of public programs 
including the social security network. These proposals, nevertheless, are not accompanied by the 
enforcement of a new culture of rights and equality – that would locate the movement on the left. 
Indeed, the 5SM seems to represent an individualistic protest against the deprivation and the 
inequalities that originated from the failure of the neoliberal system.  
Second, the 5SM does not express nationalistic or regionalist narratives and it never 
exploited ethnic divisions within Italian society. Grillo resorts to nationalistic themes just when 
he talks about economic advantages for the single states within the Eurozone. Third, it follows 
from the second point that an anti-immigrants polemic is not a part of the 5SM’s narrative. 
Although Grillo’s personal positions seem not to be too friendly towards foreigners (“Beppe 
Grillo e l’immigrazione”, 2013), he chooses to remain neutral on this highly divisive issue.   
Fourth, the anti-Europe attitude of the 5SM is more moderate than that of neopopulist 
parties. Indeed, Grillo proposes to use the weapon of the referendum to quit the common 
currency to force Germany and the states of northern Europe to change their economic policies. 
His violent aversion is not to Europe or the Euro, it is directed to the austerity policies and to the 
impoverishment they have brought about. 
Although there are not enough points of overlap to be considered part of this group of 
neopopulist parties, Grillo’s movement-party has many characteristics that are similar to them: 
the style of leadership, the violent fight against representative institutions and traditional political 
parties and the composition of its constituency (encompassing all social groups with a slight 
predominance of males). Moreover, there is an important element in the 5SM narrative that is 
typical of populist parties and of movements that have subversive goals:  it aims at gaining 
consent among groups in social and economic distress.  Mèny and Surel (2000) argue that one 
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feature of populist rhetoric consists of pitting the people against the elites by stressing the 
economic cleavage between the working class and small entrepreneurs on the one hand and 
bankers, capitalists and financiers on the other. In doing so “the people” becomes a particular 
social class which is experiencing material distress and growing anxiety for the future (Mény & 
Surel, 2000, p.195).      
  Corbetta and Gualmini (2013), in their book on the 5SM, deny the validity of this 
comparison with neopopulist parties, because the social categories these parties represent are 
those frightened by globalization and technological progress while the 5SM mainly talks to 
young, educated, Internet savvy people. But an original feature of the recent economic crisis in 
Europe is that young people have been hit hardest by social plagues like unemployment and job 
insecurity, so the highest levels of anxiety and discontent are to be found among these social 
groups.  
Grillo is aware of this situation and he knows he is less popular among retirees and public 
sector workers, the categories that feel more protected from the crisis. Indeed, he often blames 
these categories for giving political support to the existing parties (public employees mainly to 
the center- left and retirees mainly to the center-right), calling them “colluded” or “accomplices” 
(“Grillo: chi vota ancora per i vecchi partiti è colluso”, 2013) and he tries to frighten them by 
saying that this system is going to crumble and that their income and benefits will not be 
guaranteed for long (“Grillo: referendum online sull’euro”, 2013).  
In summary, even if it is not possible to put the 5SM in the group of neopopulist right-
wing parties, the similarities are numerous and significant, especially when the focus is more on 
the rhetoric and the actions of the movement and less on the platform and on officially supported 
values.   
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5.3.2. Comparison to the parties of the “new left”   
In 1988 Herbert Kitschelt described a new group of parties that were gaining support in many 
western European countries:  
They share the traditional Left’s concern for egalitarianism and political control of 
the economy, but they question centralized planning, a political process dominated 
by small political elites and the desirability of increased material affluence. 
Instead, they emphasize participatory democracy, political decentralization, and 
quality of life issues, such as environmental protection and more personalized 
social services. All left-libertarian parties shared the same core constituencies: 
younger, educated, urban, secular members of the new middle classes who work 
overproportionally in the public service sector. (p.127).  
At the beginning of his political adventure, Beppe Grillo seemed to have in mind a 
movement that could pursue these post-material ends and that could really empower the citizens 
and encourage them to take care of their communities and of the environment. The idea of 
supporting local groups made up of common citizens by allowing them to gain visibility in the 
media, was based on the desire to support a modernizing and environmentalist platform.  The 
blog too, in its first years of activity was centered on this agenda and many left-wing voters who 
felt the need for a civil reaction against corruption, misgovernment and environmental abuse 
shared its battles. Indeed, in the very logo of the 5SM the five stars represent these issues and, 
consequently, the first activists and supporters of the movement had characteristics that were 
comparable to the supporters of left libertarian parties: young, progressive and highly educated. 
Also from an organizational point of view, the 5SM was conceived following the model 
of left libertarian parties: they “have a low level of structural articulation and very loose networks 
of communication and control across levels of party organization. They bar cumulation of offices 
in order to create a diffuse power structure. Tenure in office is confined to short term and 
renewable at most for a second term. Executive party offices are volunteer posts, and paid 
parliamentarians are required to share their salary with the party” (Kitschelt, 1988, p.140). 
Grillo, in designing his movement-party, not only tried to replicate this model, but he 
tried to render it even more democratic through the use of web communication technologies. He 
thought the movement did not need executives and he implemented the rotation of the MPs in 
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institutional offices such as president of the Parliamentary group. The blog could provide the 
possibility to communicate and to involve the grassroots activists in political decisions. 
The 5SM, in practice, has been developed very differently from the original pattern. As 
explained before, the anti-politics attitude prevailed; the metaphor of the war against the party 
system became pervasive and the organization became more and more authoritarian. The profile 
of the average voter changed as well, becoming more and more distant from that of left-
libertarian parties and more similar to catch-all parties, attracting voters also from the right and 
the center.  Some critics think that Grillo meant to build such a movement-party from the 
beginning, while others say that this is Casaleggio’s main idea that was gradually accepted by 
Grillo, What it certain is that the 5SM can no longer be defined as a left libertarian party even if 
its platform is still officially inspired by some left-libertarian ideals. 
 
5.3.3. Comparison to SYRIZA, epitome of the new European radical left 
The Coalition of the Greek Radical Left, better known by its acronym SYRIZA, is a coalition of 
left-wing and radical left parties and movements. At the moment, SYRIZA is the most popular 
left-wing party in western Europe. Therefore its leader, Alexis Tsipras, has recently been 
proposed as candidate for the presidency of the EU commission by the European left parties 
(Pietrafita & Vilde, 2014). Tsipras is a very charismatic leader who has been able to bring the 
party from a five percent share of vote in 2008 – when he became leader - to 27% in the 2012 
national elections (Moschonas, 2013). 
Altourgh Tsipras’s rhetoric often uses populist themes pitting the people and the workers 
against powerful economic and political elites (Vasilopoulou, Halikiopoulou & Exadaktylos, 
2013), his style of leadership does not suffocate pluralism inside the party (Borreca, 2013), so he 
cannot be conceived of as a populist leader. SYRIZA’s platform does not support the exit of 
Greece or other countries from the Eurozone, but it demands a sharp change in the “ruinous” 
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neoliberal policies the EU adopted to exit the great recent recession (Gilson, 2014). It advocates 
the end of austerity measures and the adoption of expansive (more Keynesian) monetary and 
economic policies (Gallino, 2014), but it also demands redistribution to reduce inequality and 
ease the plagues of poverty and social marginalization.  
As is evident, SYRIZA’s “Euro-skepticism” is framed within an organic platform which 
is inspired by traditional leftist values such as social justice, solidarity and empowerment of 
people. Indeed, Tsipras blames European technocrats for having built a union that is far from the 
people and that does not support solidarity among the diverse nationalities of which Europe is 
constituted. The platform of the lists supporting Tsipras all over Europe (“The Economic 
program of SYRIZA-USF”, 2014), is a document of more than 20 pages that contains an 
extensive analysis of the economic and political situation and proposes solutions that deal with 
the complexity of the present European problems.    
The 5SM, let alone Grillo’s authoritarian style of leadership and his violent rhetoric, is 
different from SYRIZA and from leftist parties in general,. The other differences are in the form 
and content of platforms. 5SM’s proposals for a new Europe, mainly expressed by flamboyant 
declarations of its leader, are presented in a very fragmentary and simplified way. They are not 
accompanied by a consistent strategy. Indeed, the 5SM did not declare which group it wants to 
align with in the EU Parliament. 
Moreover, 5SM’s European platform lacks a consistent ideological framework. In his 
narrative, Grillo mixes left-leaning ideas and right-wing “protectionist” rhetoric in order to 
appear original, not confined to one part of the old political right-left cleavage. The song the 
5SM chose to accompany its electoral campaign is titled “Thumping the Table” (Marra, 2014), 
and the idea is that the movement, not being corrupt and tied to strong economic interests, would 
be able to obtain more favorable conditions for Italy in the EU negotiations. The 
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oversimplification of this rhetoric is the most evident difference when compared to SYRIZA’s 
message. 
 
5.3.4 Comparison to the International Protest Movement (Occupy Wall Street and 
Indignados) 
Grillo praised international protest movements like the “Indignados” and “Occupy Wall Street”, 
and repeatedly stated that the 5SM is one of them as it pursues the same goals of freedom and 
more participatory democracy (“Grillo alla CNN: «La mia pistola è la parola»”, 2013). In 
October 2013, Micah White, one of the most well-known activists of the Occupy Wall Street 
Movement, wrote an open letter to his followers in which he described the 5SM and the Occupy 
movement as part of the same international project of liberation. He suggests that the movements 
in every country follow the path and the organization of the 5SM: 
In Italy and in America we are fighting the same enemy: the world of finance, the 
interest rate lobby, people who control the economy through financial systems. 
The difference is that in Italy you are building a civic movement that participates 
in the elections; M5S has on its side 25.55% of the population, while in America 
there is no such thing as a vibrant opposition party. There is currently no strong 
movement in America that can hope for an electoral win. That is why we are 
observing and learning from the things that the 5 Star Movement is doing in Italy. 
(White, 2013) 
As it has been noted by Castells (2012), these international movements use a combination 
of online activism and occupation of public squares. The 5SM clearly adopts the same strategy, 
but in a more organized and centralized way. So its online activism has its proper venue where it 
can be disciplined and “inspired” (the blog) and its physical protests are enacted through the 
participation in Grillo’s shows in public squares. This observation leads us to the theme of 
leadership that sharply differentiates the 5SM from these protest groups). Indeed, “the Occupy 
and the Indignados refuse any long term leadership” (Natale & Ballatore 2014 p.110) (see also 
Milkman, Bamyeh, Wilson, William & Gould, 2012; Stavrides, 2012) while no one in the 5SM 
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really thinks of calling into question the role of Beppe Grillo. His strong authority transformed 
the organization of the movement as well as the possibility of internal pluralism within it.   
The second element that distinguishes the 5SM from the aforementioned protest 
movements is the different levels of importance given to the issue of economic inequality. 
Occupy Wall Street and the Indignados highlighted the necessity of redistribution and 
endeavored to render this theme visible to public opinion through the famous slogan “we are the 
99%” (Wdess, 2013). The 5SM is not as clear about this issue, as it proposes higher social 
expenditure for social program but it does not support higher taxation on rents and large estates. 
This vagueness is probably due to Grillo’s will to preserve the 5SM from being perceived as a 
left-leaning movement and so putting at risk its appeal to right leaning constituencies. 
 
5.3.5 Comparison to the Pirate Parties in Sweden and Germany 
The Pirate Parties of Sweden and Germany are political organizations that make the case for a 
more participatory democracy through the use of web technologies. They strongly criticize the 
political and economic establishments and the role of the traditional political parties in the 
political system (Niedermayer, 2013).  
Moreover, these parties support global action to “democratize” the web, granting free and 
secure access to the Internet in order to preserve this instrument from the control of the more 
powerful corporations and states. The 5SM’s platform pursues these ends, and its emphasis on 
environmental themes is similar to that of the Pirate parties (Hartleb, 2013). Things change when 
we consider themes like immigration, civil rights, and separation of state and religion. The 
platform of the Pirates parties is very progressive when it deals with the issue of migrants and 
asylum seekers:  
We consider diversity, which also develops when people of different heritage live 
together, as an enrichment to society. We recognize the mutual influence of 
discrimination by the social majority and segregation of people stigmatized as “foreign“. 
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This situation is not compatible with our concept of human dignity ….  People who seek 
refuge in Europe have the right to a life in dignity, to free movement and to participation 
in the workforce, in education and culture. (Piratenpartei, Migration and Integration, n.d.)   
 
The Pirates state their position on racism and discriminations against minorities very 
clearly:  
“Violence and intimidation due to heritage, religion or culture are unacceptable in all instances. 
Therefore, we must oppose racism and xenophobia in any form, just as all other ideologies of 
hate directed against particular groups”. The Pirates also support the right of each citizen to 
determine his or her sexual identity and not to be subject to discrimination. In their words: “The 
Pirate Party stands for a policy which respects and promotes free self-determination of gender 
and sexual identity/orientation. We reject any allocation to specific genders or gender roles by 
others” (sic) (Piratenpartei, Migration and Integration, n.d.).  
Finally, it is worth mentioning the Pirates’ position on the relations between the state and 
religious diversity, where they support a sharp separation of church and state in order to prevent 
the state from favoring any particular religion. While the Pirate parties have positions that are 
very close to those of left-libertarian parties on these issues, the 5SM does not include any of 
these themes in its platform. Again, this is evidence of Beppe Grillo’s tactical refusal to take a 
stand on divisive matters. 
The second difference between the 5SM and the Pirates, as Natale & Ballatore (2014) and 
Hartleb (2013) point out, is that the Pirate parties do not have a leader nor a very centralized 
organization: they actually tried to implement a form of “webdemocracy” through the use of an 
electronic platform for the participation of the activists in political decisions, but they 
experienced many difficulties and numerous internal disputes arose.  
This failure to successfully realize this hyper-democratic web agora was probably the 
main factor that caused a sharp decrease in their popularity after the electoral success of 2011 
and 2012. The 5SM, on the contrary, has an energetic and popular charismatic leader who takes 
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all major decisions and proposes the topics for the online discussion on the blog (Corbetta & 
Vignati, 2014). The goal of direct democracy is just something that will be established after the 
system has been defeated, and the democratic process inside the movement, as we have seen, it is 
far from being realized.  
Unlike Pirate parties, Grillo expresses violent emotions and insults in his speeches. This 
difference represents an element that allows the comedian to maintain cohesion within the 
movement by shifting the attention of his followers towards external threats and enemies. This 
distinction reveals that, although there are common features between the 5SM and protest 
movement or with the Pirate parties because of their common belief in a future webtopia, Grillo’s 
movement uses the web and its alleged democratic tendency to conduct very different political 
action.  
 
5.4 Summary 
 
The objective in this chapter has been to compare the 5SM to other populist parties in Italy, 
populist parties in some other European countries, and some international social movements.  
The comparison has mainly considered the criteria of structure, leadership style, constituency, 
and ideology and policy platform. The findings regarding each of these criteria are summarized 
below.  
The overview reveals that the 5SM is less structured than rightwing neopopulist parties, 
and more structured than International social movements profiled in this chapter. Its refusal of 
institutionalization is similar to that of the parties of the new left at the outset of their political 
history, nevertheless, unlike these parties, the 5SM's leaders exercise a strong centralized control 
on the movement. 
Beppe Grillo's leadership style is similar to that of neopopulist leaders like Bossi, Le Pen 
or Farage. Indeed, he is a charismatic leader, he takes all the major decision regarding the 
movement's policies and he hardly tolerates internal dissent. This is the biggest difference the 
5SM has with the international social movements, the Pirate parties and the progressive parties. 
88 
 
The 5SM's constituency at the beginning was similar to that of the parties of the new left 
(and also to the Pirate parties' constituencies): young, left-leaning and highly educated. As the 
movement grew, its anti-system rhetoric also started attracting right-leaning voters, with the 
consequence that, at the moment, the 5SM can be defined as a catch-all party, as it appeals to 
voters with different viewpoints. Moreover, the 5SM attracts voters from every social group with 
the significant exception of those over 65. These features are more similar to the constituency of 
right-wing neopopulist parties. 
5SM's platform puts together many heterogeneous elements. It proposes reforms aimed at 
reducing politicians' privileges and at allowing citizens more direct control over the elected. This 
is a proposal historically supported by many populist movements. Moreover, it proposes 
environmental protection, a theme that is typical of the parties of the new left. In addition, the 
5Sm advocates a program to reduce taxation that is similar to that of neopopulist parties. Finally, 
it wages a strong polemic against European austerity policies, similar to that of the radical left. 
5SM's ideology expresses a strong anti-establishment attitude which is similar to that of 
international social movements. Moreover, Grillo's movement-party shares with the Pirate parties 
a sort of cybertopia - namely a belief in the establishment of direct democracy based on the 
possibilities offered by the new web technologies.  
As it is evident, the 5SM does not fit in any categories of anti-establishment parties and 
movement the literature proposes. Nevertheless, many characteristics of Grillo's movement-
party, especially the leadership style and its rhetoric, can be better conceived as "an evolution" of 
the recent right-wing Italian populism. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
 
To reiterate, the objective of this thesis has been to explain the rise and success of the 5SM 
movement within the Italian political system and its classification as a populist movement-party.   
The objective in this concluding section is to summarize and analyze the findings related to each 
of those objectives and discuss the need or prospects for further research. Accordingly, this 
chapter consists of three major sections devoted to each of those objectives in turn.  
 
6.2 Summary of Findings 
 
Chapter 2 revealed that the rise and success of the 5SM are attributable to a combination of 
economic and political factors and the capacity of its principal agents? The major economic 
factor was the harsh economic recession in Italy that worsened as a result of European austerity 
policies and the inability of the European Union to make much progress in dealing with the 
economic crisis. That problem was compounded by the fact that during that time, after years of 
bad governance and public management, the political system was in a chaotic state and decision-
making had reached an impasse. These economic and political crises led citizens to lose 
confidence in both the Italian and the European political and financial institutions to reach one of 
lowest levels in the postwar period. Grillo and Casaleggio managed to exploit this discontent 
through a strong anti-establishment message and, as explained in more detail in chapter three, the 
mobilization of individuals through the effective use of the Internet and other media.  
Chapter 3 described the main characteristics of the 5SM as a political entity. The analysis 
focused on the structure, the internal governance, the political strategies, the composition of its 
constituency, and its ideology. Special attention was devoted to the important role the Internet 
plays in every facet of the 5SM as a political entity. Chapter 3 also explained that the movement 
has not had a conventional institutionalized organizational structure. Instead, it has been 
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organized around a website that coordinates the action of many local groups (or cells) linked 
virtually around the country.  
It also revealed that although 5SM’s ideology – or political philosophy - aims to establish 
a new form of ‘direct democracy’ where the citizen no longer needs political representation, 
Grillo’s leadership is exercised in an authoritarian way and his charisma is fundamental for the 
movement’s cohesion. This is also demonstrated by the way the movement uses the official 
website. There, the dynamics between the users and the management reflect the tendency 
towards concentration of power and influence that has been observed in Internet interactions. In 
other words, the communication within the movement is very vertical and centralized so that the 
participants do not all have the same opportunity to spread their ideas and proposals.     
Initially the 5SM’s constituency was composed mainly of young and progressive left-
wing voters, but later the movements also started attracting voters from the right-wing parties 
and a wide range of social groups. Its political platform is silent on politically divisive issues, 
and is mainly built around the need for a renewal of the overly corrupt Italian political system.      
Chapter 4 explained that the 5SM has been and continues to be a movement-party as 
described by Kitschel (1993) — a party which elects candidates to Parliament, but resists a 
complete institutionalization as a party.  Chapter 4 also established that the 5SM has had the 
characteristics of populist mobilization described by Meny and Surel (2002). The chapter 
concluded that 5SM's populism cannot be defined either as right wing or as left wing because it 
does not subscribe to some of the extreme ideological views of the left related to redistribution of 
wealth, or to some of the extreme ideological views of the right regarding rule by a particular 
group and the lack of concern for minority rights.   
Grillo's message comes from a “cultural regression” that has happened in Italy in the past 
thirty years and that has been exploited and supported by conservative populist leaders like 
Berlusconi and Bossi. Chapter 4 also explained that some strategies used by the 5SM can be 
called extremist, as they use the democratic institutions for ends that transcend reform of the 
91 
 
system. Moreover, the attitude towards political opponents and internal pluralism is in many 
respects similar to that of totalitarian movements of the past.  
Chapter 5 revealed similarities and differences between the 5SM and other populist 
movements and parties in Italy, and other groups of Western anti-establishment parties and 
movements in terms of their structure, leadership, ideology and policy positions. The analysis of 
the characteristics and the political trajectory of the Northern League, Forza Italia and the Italia 
dei Valori provided a description of the recent parties and leaders who dominated the Italian 
political scene in the last twenty years. Grillo’s populism is very similar to Di Pietro’s anti-
corruption mobilization; nevertheless his violent rhetoric, his disrespect for democratic 
institutions and his buffoonish attitudes place him closer to Berlusconi and Bossi.  
As explained in Chapter 2, Grillo can be considered an offspring of the culture that 
spurred anti-politics from the beginning of the Second Republic and that led to Berlusconi’s era 
right-wing cultural hegemony. That explains why, though the 5SM cannot be considered a right 
wing movement, it is likely to find room for the development of his populist message on the right 
of the political spectrum, especially if Berlusconi continues to lose appeal as happened in the last 
three years.    
The comparison, then, shifted from Italy to an international dimension. The focus has 
been on the groups of right-wing neopopulist parties, on the parties of the new left, on the new 
radical left (exemplified by SIRIZA in Greece),  on the Pirate parties in Sweden and Germany, 
and on the international social movements. The main goal was to see whether and why the 5SM 
belongs, or if it is at least very close, to any of these groups of parties. 
The 5SM is more structured than the international social movements and the Pirates 
parties and less structured than the right wing neopopulist parties and the parties of the radical 
left. The comparison revealed that the 5SM is structured like the parties of the new left at the 
beginning of their political experience. Indeed, Grillo's movement resists institutionalization and 
refuses the selection of a group of party leaders, and conceives of the MPs as simple citizens who 
are given access to political institutions. Nevertheless, the strongly centralized control exercised 
by the 5SM's leaders over every activity of the movement is an element that differentiates this 
movement from the parties of the new left and the environmentalist parties.  
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Strong, charismatic leadership sharply differentiates the 5SM from all the group of 
parties considered except the neopopulist right-wing parties. Grillo's style of leadership and 
rhetoric is similar to that of right wing populist leaders like Berlusconi, Bossi and Farage. The 
5SM's constituency, at the beginning, was similar to those of the Pirate parties or to the 
environmentalist parties of the new left: young, left-leaning and highly educated. After the first 
electoral victory in May 2012, the 5SM started attracting voters also from the right side of the 
political spectrum, and its support grew consistently among every social group. 
5SM's platform puts together diverse proposals. Like the parties of the new left, it 
supports environmental protection; like SYRIZA and the radical left it strongly opposes 
European austerity policies without resorting to an outspoken nationalist rhetoric; like the 
neopopulist right-wing parties it opposes high taxation; like the international social movements 
and the parties of the new left it demands a radical reform of politics that gives the citizens more 
control over politicians. 
5SM's ideology essentially consists of two elements. The first is a very extreme 
opposition to the political and economic establishment, both at the national level and at the 
international level. This attitude is very close to that of international protest movements. Second, 
the 5SM, similarly to the Pirate parties, aims to establish a new form of direct democracy based 
upon internet technologies. This utopian view always includes the firm critique of today's 
representative democracies. 
 
6.3 Commentary on the Findings 
 
It is evident that the outstanding success of the 5SM is explainable primarily through an analysis 
of the socio-economic situation in Italy.  For Italy, the ongoing recession is surely the most 
dramatic slump after WWII, and its causes are diverse and have different origins. Some of them 
are internal and are mainly due to the legacy of the Berlusconi era and with the lack of 
competitiveness of the Italian economic system. Others are European and are linked to, first, the 
failure of European integration (manifesting itself in the lack of solidarity among member states) 
and, second, with the difficult situation of the European banking system. As a result, this crisis 
appears to the Italian citizens to have no end, but what is worse is that they perceive they do not 
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have any political control over it. The complexity of the situation is difficult to explain by the 
politicians to the mass of citizens, and this brought the people to dramatically lose confidence in 
the political institutions in an unprecedented way.  
 Italian democracy is really in bad condition. Indeed, after years of misgovernment, where 
corruption flourished and growth stagnated, the recession undermined the economic security of 
many citizens as well as their hope for a possible redemption. Anthony Painter efficaciously 
explains this tragic situation by making a distinction between the concepts of ‘stress’ and ‘crisis’. 
He states that the latter occurs when “a political system is no longer legitimate… it can no longer 
complete the tasks that are set for it”. Even in the crisis of public debt, and after the harsh 
austerity measures imposed by the Troika, many European states just experienced stress, with the 
exception of Greece and Italy: indeed, these democracies “have shown to be incapable of 
responding to the complexities instigated by the Eurozone crisis”, therefore they “have faced 
democratic crises or at least extreme stress” (Painter, 2013 p. 14). 
 From the point of view of political agency, Beppe Grillo undoubtedly succeeded in 
interpreting the rage and the desire for change many citizens felt. He, along with his spin doctor 
Casaleggio, devised a brand, a structure and a platform that really seemed new and revolutionary 
to the Italian voters. Grillo's charisma, until now, has been fundamental both in giving visibility 
to the 5SM and in keeping the movement united. Nevertheless, the effort to maintain this image 
of a “pure”, “uncontaminated” neither right-wing nor left-wing movement, intensifies the 
contradictions that are latent inside the 5SM. The most important of these contradictions is the 
contrast between the conservative-leaning and the progressive leaning activists within the 5SM, 
and the inconsistency between the formal praise of pluralism and the strong political control over 
the movement exercised by Grillo and Casaleggio.     
 Up to this moment, the political strategy used by Grillo was clearly that of betting on the 
forthcoming collapse of the political system, by refusing both institutionalization and consistent 
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and effective cooperation with the other parties. Anyway, if the Italian political system 
overcomes this period of extreme stress, it is likely that the 5SM will take a stand on many 
positions, embodying a more consistent agenda and a more complete and definite political 
profile. For what concerns the analysis of the 5SM's characteristics, the most relevant finding has 
been that the web has not been used to increase political participation, more shared decision-
making and horizontal communication among activists and followers. Quite to the contrary, the 
5SM's blog is organized in a very centralized way: it is used as a tool that allows the leaders to 
control the debate inside the movement in order to limit internal pluralism. This factor is very 
important because it allows a better understanding of the style of leadership and the 
organizational structure of the 5SM. Most importantly, it demonstrates that the very idea of 
direct democracy through web technology is still far from being realized inside Grillo's 
movement-party. 
 From the point of view of political classification, it is clear that the 5SM does not fit 
existing political categories. It can be conceived of a mixing of characteristics that come from 
diverse political traditions. Nevertheless, many of these elements are grounded in the Italian 
political culture, where the conservative populist parties exploited their supremacy in the media 
system and their connection to the Catholic Church to establish the regressive popular mindset 
that has been described before.     
 This so-called “low-culture hegemony” (Panarari, 2012) favored the rise of right-wing 
populist movements that have dominated the Italian political scene for the last 20 years. Many 
centrist voters, who for decades supported the moderate Christian Democratic Party, became 
increasingly extremist and ended up voting for leaders that incarnated authoritarian anti-state 
attitudes. Approximately 20 years after the First Republic crumbled, there currently exists much 
room on the right of the political spectrum for populist discourses and leaders; the majority of 
Italians are located in this area. Moreover, Berlusconi and Bossi gradually normalized an 
abrasive and often subversive rhetoric that rendered constructive public political debate almost 
impossible. 
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 It is from this popular culture that Grillo emerged.  His style of communication, as 
Santoro points out, draws on the television pattern, which a showman performs in front of a 
passive audience. The alleged horizontality of the web does not exist in interactions within the 
5SM. Indeed, the most widespread tendency of the Internet is one favouring concentration of 
power and influence (Miconi, 2014) and the 5SM ironically epitomizes this trend with its very 
centralized organization. If participatory democracy through the web is the decisive element that 
would make the movement-party new and innovative, then it is evident that thus far this attempt 
was unsuccessful.  
 In Italy the most notable political commentators are currently debating the nature of the 
5SM. While some experts classify the movement-party as essentially right-wing, others highlight 
its role in expressing the voice of socially distressed people. Therefore, while the former perceive 
the 5SM as a dangerous entity for Italian democracy, the latter consider it as a stimulus for 
political change and are not fearful of Grillo’s violent rhetoric against the institutions. 
 Eugenio Scalfari (2007), one of the most famous Italian commentators, maintains that 
Grillo’s political message incarnates one central characteristic of the Italian right, the rhetoric 
that make people feel not responsible for the destiny of the state.  As did Berlusconi, Bossi, 
Guglielmo Giannini and other populist leaders in Italian history, Grillo incites individuals to not 
feel responsible for the failures of the country and for the common good of the state. Therefore, 
the state is only seen as limiting citizens’ activities and as an intrusive tax collector.   
 The left-wing Italian intellectual group Wu Ming (2013) states that, although it is not 
possible to define Grillo’s movement as fascist, many fascists actually vote for the 5SM. 
Moreover, Wu Ming continues, “the 5SM is indebted with (sic) different right-wing traditions… 
and, certainly, the right-wing elements of the programme are more relevant than the left-wing 
ones”. Also the “confused neitherism” (Wu Ming, 2013) that refuses any political location is 
typical of right wing movements like fascism at their beginnings. Therefore, Wu Ming describes 
the 5SM as an entity that would prevent any substantial reform of the Italian political system and 
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of the austerity-driven neoliberal logic that inspired recent economic policies. The reason Wu 
Ming derives these conclusions is that it argues that the 5SM essentially arises from an 
individualistic libertarian culture that constitutes the basis for recent right-wing populism. In Wu 
Ming’s opinion, while Grillo maintains his aim is to destroy the system, the effects of his actions 
are just the opposite. 
 From what is discussed in chapter 3, it is not possible to classify the 5SM as a right-wing 
movement due to its many contradictory stances on divisive issues. Nevertheless, the cultural 
milieu Grillo exploits is the same that favored the domination by Berlusconi and Bossi of Italy in 
the last 20 years, and this is epitomized by the similarity of leadership style. The recent populist 
Italian movements such as Forza Italia and the Northern League arose as anti-politics libertarian 
parties and ended up on the extreme right of the political spectrum. It is clear that the commercial 
television culture that followed the huge concentration of media power in Berlusconi’s hands 
induced an expansion of populist movements on the right of the political spectrum. From these 
observations it is reasonable to expect that if Berlusconi’s ability to attract voters should decline 
any time soon, Grillo is likely to gain the support of many right-wing voters. Consequently, the 
5SM’s message is expected to change in order to attract this conservative constituency.  
 Scholars thus far have been cautious in classifying Grillo’s movement-party because it 
currently remains ill-defined in several aspects as it refuses institutionalization and opposes 
taking a precise stand on the issues that would identify it with a part of the political spectrum 
(Diamanti, 2014; Biorcio & Natale, 2013; Corbetta & Vignati, 2013; Corbetta & Vignati 2014). 
The mix of political characteristics represented by the 5SM is unique, and the way it uses the 
web is different from all traditional parties. Therefore it is necessary to observe how the 
movement-party will act if it governs some major cities or regions: whether it will use the web to 
give a voice to citizens in political decisions, and whether, and in what sense, it will take a stand 
on the issues that still divide the right from the left in terms of ideology and interests.  
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 Nevertheless, what is evident from this analysis is that besides the 5SM’s ill-defined 
nature there are some behaviours that are typical of extremist or totalitarian movements, such as 
frequent declaration that parties and unions are no longer needed and will be abolished in the 
future; the repeated prediction of the imminent collapse of the system to increase popular anxiety 
and thus reduce society to an indistinct mass without divisions and interests; the violence of the 
insults towards institutions, political enemies and critics; its refusal to institutionalize itself; and 
its refusal to set a precise platform to avoid being tied to it, and therefore to be free to pursue 
maximum popular approval.  
 According to Painter’s recent distinction between populism and extremism (2013 p.25-
26), there are two characteristics of the 5SM that would change its populism into extremism: the 
attitude towards hate and violence and the instrumental use of the democratic institutions.  The 
5SM has not yet been physically violent as Golden Dawn has been in Greece, nevertheless verbal 
attacks of its critics are frequent and encouraged by the leader. Moreover, Grillo expressed 
support for every rally and protest that threatened to overthrow the legitimate institutions and 
urged the police to act in concert with the protesters against the legitimate political 
establishment. Regarding the instrumental use of democratic institutions, it is evident that the 
5SM uses its MPs and their presence in Parliament as a hindrance to political reforms and as a 
means of making propaganda for the movement-party. The systematic refusal of a constructive 
dialogue with the other parties in Parliament is central evidence of this destabilizing political 
strategy.   
 In conclusion, if it is true that there is still room for a democratic evolution of the 5SM 
and that its function for the political system can still be positive, it is necessary to point out some 
essential factors. Its populism is still impossible to place somewhere along the right-left 
spectrum, but the movement declares some totalitarian ends and often enacts strategies that can 
be deemed as extremist. It is not clear to what extent these elements are linked to the situation of 
extreme stress that Italian democracy is experiencing and whether they will disappear if the 
situation improves. However, the tendency towards authoritarianism is present in the movement 
and the way the web has been used so far is consistent with this tendency. The paradox of 
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populist movements is that they often become something completely opposed to what they 
initially dreamed of becoming; that is why the delusion of direct democracy can engender 
another hard blow to the already feeble Italian democracy.   
 
6.4 Directions for further research 
 
The first issue that should be at the center of the debate deals with the political evolution of the 
5SM. This topic is important to determine in a more definite way the nature of the movement-
party as well as its role both inside the Italian political system and the European institutions. 
Second, the topic of the 5SM's use of the web should be examined in greater depth. Indeed, for 
Grillo's movement Internet communication is fundamental both from the point of view of the 
movement-party's internal organization and as the privileged tool of political marketing. 
On a more general political perspective, in the globalized world of the last decades, 
nation states are losing sovereignty to global forces over which politics does not have any control 
(Bauman, 2000). As a result, almost everywhere citizens are losing confidence in the efficacy of 
representative liberal democracy (Blumler & Coleman, 2009). This trend provides a favorable 
context for the rise of populist personalized movements that try to establish more direct relations 
with the constituency and at the same time attempt to give citizens more weight in political 
decisions. Furthermore, the new tools of web communication are changing the way political 
issues are discussed at every level. 
Research, therefore, should concentrate on three directions: first, on studying the 
evolution of populism and evaluating its effect on liberal democratic political systems; second, 
on assessing to what extent web communication is affecting the management and the discussion 
of political issues (Chadwick, 2013); and, third, whether the new internet technologies constitute 
means of democratization that increase political participation or whether they are tools that just 
increase the influence and the power of wealthy and powerful groups (Morozov, 2011). 
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